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Summary
Synthetic biology (SynBio) is the engineering of biology, which aims to develop new biological
systems and impart new functions to viable cells. SynBio has potential applications in the agri-food
system that would include deliberate release of these microorganisms into the environment, requiring
a premarket authorisation in the European Union (EU).
This Opinion addresses four terms of reference (ToR) requested by the European Commission on the
safety evaluation of SynBio developments in agri-food use: 1) identification of sectors/advances in the
agri-food system considered among SynBioM developments (excluding bioremediation, de-extinction,
bioweapons/biopreparedness, medical use, biofuels); 2) identification of potential risks and potential
novel hazards SynBioMs could pose for the environment (restricted to wildlife and excluding humans and
farmed animals); 3) evaluating the adequacy of existing guidelines for risk assessment of current and
near future SynBioMs (arriving to EU market in the next decade; due to the fast research developments
also SynBioMs expected in the wider future such as minimal cells, protocells and xenobiology were
included); and 4) identification of specific areas where updated Guidance is needed. The scope of this
Opinion is limited to viable microorganisms expected to be deliberately released into the environment.
The previous work on SynBio by Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health
Risks (SCENIHR), the Scientific Committee on Health and Environmental Risks (SCHER) and the
Scientific Committee on Consumer Safety (SCCS) was considered and complemented with the outputs
of a horizon scan, which was commissioned by the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) to identify
the most realistic and forthcoming SynBioM cases of relevance to the terms of reference. In addition,
two complementary cases were analysed by the authors of this Opinion to include SynBioM
developments expected in the wider future.
It is recognised that information on new SynBioM products for deliberate release may not be made
publicly available at early stages in their development, and this limits the predictive capacity of this
Opinion.
As a first step, the current Opinion evaluates existing guidelines for the microbial characterisation
and environmental risk assessment (ERA) of genetically modified microorganisms for deliberate release
into the environment, for their general adequacy for risk assessment of microorganisms obtained
through SynBio. Second, with the above-mentioned cases in mind, the existing guidelines were
evaluated for their adequacy and sufficiency. As a third step, an overall gap analysis was performed
capturing also outlooks for future SynBioM developments. EFSA consulted EU Member States and
interested parties during a public consultation and the comments received have been incorporated
whenever appropriate.
ToR 1: Identification of sectors in the agri-food system considered among SynBioM developments
No other sectors/advances in addition to the six identified by the SCENIHR, SCCS and SCHER
were identified. These were 1) genetic part libraries and methods; 2) minimal cells and designer
chassis; 3) protocells and artificial cells; 4) xenobiology; 5) DNA synthesis and genome editing;
and 6) citizen science (do-it-yourself biology). For this opinion, citizen science was not considered
relevant and therefore excluded.
No clear criteria to differentiate between a GMM and a SynBioM could be identified. From a
technical point of view, SynBioM applications could be ready for deliberate release into the
environment of the EU within the next decade. However, extensively engineered SynBioMs (e.g.
minimal cells and protocells, or xenobionts), falling within the remit of EFSA, are not expected to
be deliberately released during the next decade.
ToR 2: Identification of potential risks and potential novel hazards SynBioMs could pose for the
environment
Hazards for current and near-future SynBioMs aimed to be deliberately released into the
environment do not differ from those for GMMs developed by established techniques of genetic
modification. Although no novel hazards have been identified for near future SynBioMs, the
efficacy by which SynBioMs interact with their biotic and abiotic environment may differ. This may
lead to increased exposure and therefore may result in higher risk. Altered efficacy can be related
to levels of exposure by e.g. 1) increased environmental survival and host colonisation, 2)
increased invasiveness and, 3) increased competition in naturally evolved microbial communities
due to enhanced fitness, thereby displacing beneficial microorganisms or disrupting, 4) altered
metabolism, e.g. by changes in substrate utilisation opening new environmental niches;
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5) altered lifestyle, e.g. by energy use (aerobic versus anaerobic) opening new environmental
niches.
Wider future SynBioMs, including xenobionts, aimed for deliberate release into the environment,
may lead to novel hazards compared to microorganisms developed with established genetic
modification techniques, e.g. due to 1) new-to-nature organisms/products/constituents possibly
with poorly understood interactions with its biotic and abiotic environment, 2) xeno-proteins with
new enzymatic properties, i.e. modified substrate specificity or higher environmental robustness,
and so opening new environmental niches and 3) substantial reduction of the genome could lead to
unexpected interactions with other organisms (e.g. those that lead to evasion of the immune
system).
The assessment to identify novel hazards or risks should always be performed on a case-by-case
basis.
ToR 3: Evaluating the adequacy of existing guidelines for risk assessment of current and near future
SynBioMs
For the microbial (genotypic and phenotypic) characterisation of SynBioMs and the safety of the
genetic modification, the FEEDAP Guidance on microbial characterisation (EFSA FEEDAP Panel,
2018), the CEP statement (EFSA CEP Panel, 2019) and the GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel,
2011) are useful as a basis for the risk assessment. The adequacy of existing EFSA Guidances for
SynBioMs depends on the degree of familiarity of the SynBioM and chassis with the non-modified
microorganism. Whole genome sequencing (WGS) as basis of the analysis is adequate and
essential for SynBioMs, irrespective of them being bacteria, archaea, viruses or eukaryotic
microorganisms such as protists, fungi and micro algae. WGS can be used for taxonomic
identification, identification of antimicrobial resistance genes, searching sequences related to
antimicrobial production, toxigenic and virulence/pathogenic characteristics, mobile genetic
elements and characterisation of the genetic modifications of the SynBioMs.
For the ERA of SynBioMs, the EFSA GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011) is a useful basis.
The EFSA GMM Guidance is adequate for assessing horizontal gene transfer (HGT) potential for
near-future SynBioM cases. Future EFSA Guidance updates would benefit from expanding with
descriptions of approaches to test for adverse effects and their likelihood resulting from HGT. The
comparative approach is still feasible for near-future SynBioM cases. Given a potentially altered
efficacy of near future SynBioMs to interact with their biotic and abiotic environment, it is noted
that the risk assessment covering ERA compartments as potential SynBioM habitats beyond the
main receiving one may become more relevant than currently foreseen. For wider future cases,
the comparative approach may still be sufficient, depending on the familiarity of the SynBioM
with non-modified microorganisms with a history of safe use.
For post-market environmental monitoring (PMEM), the EFSA GMM Guidance provides the
principles for detection and PMEM, which are applicable for near future products containing viable
SynBioM.
ToR 4: Identification of specific areas where updated guidance is needed
For microbial and molecular characterisation of SynBioM, as well as for GMMs, guidance and
knowledge is recommended to be developed: 1) for micro-algae: specialised guidance for
genomic and phenotypic characterisation; 2) for yeast and fungi: phenotypic testing for
antimycotic resistance; 3) for xenobionts: for the new-to-nature components guidance not solely
based on history of use and the comparative approach; 4) for xenonucleic acids: guidance for
characterisation and detection; and 5) for xenobionts, extensively engineered SynBioM, micro-
algae and viruses: suitable model systems for testing virulence and pathogenicity for non-target
hosts.
For ERA of SynBioMs as well as for GMMs, future guidance updates should take into
consideration all agri-food uses and take into account all microorganisms (e.g. micro-algae,
viruses), their relevant exposure routes and receiving environments and should address all
‘specific areas of risk’ as per Directive 2001/18/EC with definitions of endpoints and descriptions
of up-to-date methodologies. For extensively engineered SynBioMs, such as xenobionts, other
risk assessment approaches may be considered that are not solely based on the comparative
approach for new-to-nature components.
For PMEM for near-future SynBioMs as well as for GMMs, guidance and knowledge is
recommended to be developed: 1) descriptions of fit-for-purpose approaches to monitor for
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potential adverse effects resulting from the deliberate environmental release and 2) detailed
descriptions of detection methods. For PMEM for wider future SynBioMs, suitable detection
methods can be challenging to provide, because of the xeno-DNA structure.
The following is recommended: i) research for innovative approaches in the frame of ERA of SynBioMs
as well as GMMs, focusing on methods to assess HGT, invasiveness and other areas of risk for SynBioMs
deliberately released into the environment; ii) additional research on (functional) gene/genome
annotation for all microorganisms, especially for understudied groups like micro-algae; iii) increasing
knowledge on microbial interactions, microbiome function and interactions with the receiving
environments for the wider understanding of community function and risk assessment/management of
the effect of SynBioMs as well as GMMs; iv) development and deployment of system approaches, which
should rely on large-scale mathematical and statistical models as well as on semantic technologies and
big data analytics to support (environmental) risk assessment; and v) the concept of developing a limited
number of engineerable, safe-by-design and reusable SynBioM chassis to create the opportunity to base
the risk assessment on the performance of the chassis under prespecified environmental conditions.
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1. Introduction
Synthetic biology (SynBio) is an interdisciplinary field at the interface of engineering and biology
aiming to develop new biological systems and impart new functions to viable cells. It uses modern
engineering principles supported by mathematical modelling and analytical/biochemical approaches for
the design, assembly and deployment of genetic parts.
The principles of standardisation and modularity facilitate the engineering process and iterative
engineering cycles of ‘design-build-test-learn’. This enhances the progress in developing new designs of
genetic parts and their assembly into higher order biological networks with new characteristics and
functions. The application of modelling and computer-aided design informs and predicts the outcomes
of different engineering strategies to achieve optimal functionality. Subsequently, the models are
improved by the inclusion of quantitative data generated from the ‘design-build-test-learn’ cycles. So,
by bridging engineering, life sciences and computational modelling, the range of applications and
products that can be developed expands and the predictability of biotechnology is improved.
SynBio has potential applications in the food and feed chain that would require under current
legislation a pre-market authorisation in Europe. Some of those applications may include the deliberate
release of engineered organisms into the environment (e.g. as SynBio plants or SynBio microorganisms
for plant growth promotion or plant protection product (PPP)) and hence will be subject to an
environmental risk assessment (ERA). This is also reported by the Scientific Advice Mechanism (SAM)
Explanatory note of April 2017 (SAM, 2017) on new techniques in agricultural biotechnology,1 outlining
the agricultural application of new techniques in the fields of SynBio and gene drive.
Previously in 2014 and 2015, the European Commission’s Scientific Committee on Emerging and
Newly Identified Health Risks (SCENIHR), the Scientific Committee on Health and Environmental Risks
(SCHER) and the Scientific Committee on Consumer Safety (SCCS) had published2 three opinions on
SynBio, addressing six SynBio developments: 1) genetic part libraries and methods; 2) minimal cells and
designer chassis; 3) protocells and artificial cells; 4) xenobiology; 5) DNA synthesis and genome editing;
and 6) citizen science (do-it-yourself biology). The opinions addressed the definition of SynBio, risk
assessment methodologies and safety aspects, risks to the environment and biodiversity and research
priorities in the field of SynBio. SCENIHR, SCCS and SCHER concluded that new SynBio developments
may be assessed using current methodology used for genetically modified organisms (GMOs) risk
assessment. However, the rapidly evolving technologies may require existing methodologies to be
revisited at regular intervals and improved when necessary to continue ensuring safety.
Therefore, as a proactive measure, the European Commission requested the European Food Safety
Authority (EFSA) for an opinion on GMOs developed using SynBio approaches and the implications, if
any, for risk assessment methodologies. EFSA identified a total of six Work packages to be reflected in
6 Opinions to be developed, according to organism group and risk assessment aspects (see
Section 1.3).
1.1. Definitions for SynBio for the Terms of Reference
Synthetic biology has been previously defined as follows by SCENIHR, SCCS and SCHER upon
request of the European Commission2: ‘Synthetic biology is the application of science, technology and
engineering to facilitate and accelerate the design, manufacture and/or modification of genetic
materials in viable organisms’. This definition is used as a starting point for the present Opinion due to
the request of the European Commission to build on the Opinions of SCENIHR, SCCS and SCHER.
The Convention on Biological Diversity3 further clarified that ‘While there is no internationally
agreed definition of ‘synthetic biology’, key features of synthetic biology include the ‘de novo’ synthesis
of genetic material and an engineering-based approach to develop components, organisms and
products’. This further clarification establishes the link for the request to support the European Union
(EU) in the work under the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
1 https://ec.europa.eu/research/sam/index.cfm?pg=agribiotechnology
2 SCENIHR, SCCS, SCHER (2014) Synthetic Biology I Definition, Opinion, September 2014. Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/
health/scientific_committees/emerging/docs/scenihr_o_044.pdf
SCENIHR, SCCS, SCHER (2015) Synthetic Biology II -Risk assessment methodologies and safety aspects, Opinion, May 2015.
Available online: http://ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/docs/scenihr_o_048.pdf
SCENIHR, SCCS, SCHER (2015) Synthetic Biology III –Research priorities, Opinion, December 2015. Available online: http://
ec.europa.eu/health/scientific_committees/emerging/docs/scenihr_o_050.pdf
3 https://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-12/information/cop-12-inf-11-en.pdf
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1.2. Background and Terms of Reference as provided by the requestor
Building on SCENIHR, SCCS and SCHER Opinions and taking into account available literature and
previous analyses carried out by EU Member States or at the international level, the Commission asked
EFSA, in accordance with Article 29(1) of Regulation (EC) No 178/2002 (European Commission, 2002),
for an opinion on GMOs developed through synthetic biology and their implications for risk assessment
methodologies. The scope of the present mandate is limited to agri-food uses.4 In this context:
1) EFSA was asked to consider whether and which newer sectors/advances should be
considered among SynBio developments, in addition to the six identified by the SCs (ToR1).
2) EFSA was requested to identify, if possible, potential risks in terms of impact on humans,
animals and the environment that current and near-future SynBio developments could pose;
in this respect EFSA was also asked to identify potential novel hazards compared with
those of established techniques of genetic modification5 (ToR2).
3) EFSA was requested to determine whether the existing guidelines for risk assessment are
adequate and sufficient for current and near-future SynBio developments or whether there
is a need for updated guidances (ToR3).
4) In the latter case EFSA was requested to identify the specific areas where such updated
guidances are needed (ToR4).
EFSA was also requested to provide technical and scientific expertise on risk assessment of GMOs
obtained through SynBio to support the EU in the work under the Convention on Biological Diversity
and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety.
1.3. Interpretation of the Terms of Reference and scope
The mandate received from the EC was split in six Work packages by EFSA to be reflected in 6
Opinions to be developed:
1) Microbial characterisation and ERA of genetically modified microorganisms.
2) Molecular characterisation and ERA of genetically modified plants.
3) Food and feed risk assessment of genetically modified microorganisms.
4) Food and feed risk assessment of genetically modified plants.
5) Molecular characterisation and ERA of genetically modified animals.
6) Food and feed risk assessment of genetically modified animals.
The current Opinion is addressing Work package 1.
The following interpretations to the ToRs are made for the development of this Opinion, in
agreement with the EC6:
• Not all of the six developments previously identified by the SCs were considered relevant and
citizen science was excluded.
• ‘Near future’: for this mandate, this is interpreted as reaching the EU market in the next
decade. This is reflected in Section 2.3 when selecting three out of four of the case studies.
Due to the specific biology of microorganisms, the wide variety of organisms that can be used
(including viruses and algae) and fast research development in this field, also SynBioM
developments expected in the wider future as minimal cells and protocells were not excluded
and xenobiology was included as a case study.
• ‘Agri-food uses’: on footnote 5 of the mandate ‘For the purpose of this mandate agri-food uses
means agri/food/feed products falling within the remit of EFSA’, further clarifications were
needed to determine which applications fall within the remit of EFSA, within this mandate and
within the available time frame. The limited time frame led to the explicit exclusion of
bioremediation applications from this mandate. By extrapolation, the following applications are
also excluded from this mandate: de-extinction, bioweapons/biopreparedness, medical use,
and biofuels (see inclusion Criterion 2 in Section 2.2).
4 For the purpose of this mandate, agri-food uses means agri/food/feed products falling within the remit of EFSA.
5 For the purpose of this mandate, the term ‘established techniques of genetic modification’ refers to various genetic engineering
techniques that have been significantly used over the last 30 years to produce genetically modified organisms, such as those
that have been authorised under Directive 2001/18/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1829/2003.
6 See correspondence under mandate M-2018-0205 in the EFSA register of questions: http://registerofquestions.efsa.europa.eu/
roqFrontend/wicket/page?3
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• For this Opinion, ToR2 was limited to deliberate release into the environment (including
wildlife). The exposure to humans and farmed animals (accidental or deliberate) will be
specifically addressed in a further Work package of this mandate (WP3), covering the food/
feed aspects of microorganisms derived from synthetic biology approaches.
• ‘Existing guidelines for risk assessment’: see Section 2.1.
• The scope of this Opinion is limited to viable microorganisms expected to be deliberately
released into the environment (Category 4 as defined in EFSA GMO Panel, 2011).
The Opinion is produced to support the EC, but is also targeted to the public, scientific community
and stakeholders, companies and institutions that were able to comment during the public
consultation.
2. Data and methodologies
2.1. Existing guidelines, ad hoc expert Working Group and its strategy
EFSA established an ad hoc expert Working Group7 (WG) of the Scientific Committee (SC) on the
Microbial Characterisation (MC) and ERA of SynBioMs. In delivering its Scientific Opinion, the SC,
together with the ad hoc expert Working Group, considered the current GMO legislation and
corresponding (EFSA) Guidance documents. The documents that are relevant for MC of SynBioMs are
presented in Table 1; those for ERA of deliberate release of SynBioMs are presented in Table 2.
Section 4 of this Opinion fulfils ToRs 2, 3 and 4. For missing issues, identified under ToR4 for example,
other sectorial EFSA Guidance documents or international guidelines were also considered for their
adequacy to the risk assessment of SynBioMs (i.e. applicable guidance for microorganisms used as
feed additives, PPPs, novel foods, intelligent food packaging (sensors) or other uses under Directive
2001/18/EC). As agreed with the European Commission, the current mandate was not foreseen to
check in detail if all these sectorial guidances are applicable to handle viable SynBioMs.
The WG has reviewed the results of horizon scanning (see Section 2.2) and the available published
information. Primary references of relevance to this mandate were identified by the WG members (up
to 3 March 2020).
The WG has adopted a strategy based on a three-phase approach:
• Phase 1, focused on the analysis of existing EFSA Guidances and underlying EU legislation,
was aimed to evaluate section-by-section the adequacy and applicability of available risk
assessment approaches for current and near-future SynBioM developments. Although the
reference documents in Tables 1 and 2 relate to food/feed use, the evaluations in Phase 1
were carried out having a broader spectrum of microorganisms and a broader spectrum of
applications in mind.
• Phase 2 was aimed to test the adequacy of existing guidance documents in a realistic/most
relevant scenario. To reach this goal, four case studies were identified and selected using the
criteria described in detail in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. These four cases were used to challenge
the existing guidelines and to identify possible limitations. The results of Phase 2 are
prevalently presented in table format after each Section.
• Phase 3 was aimed at an overall gap analysis that could not be captured by the previous
phases (i.e. gaps disconnected from the existing guidance documents listed in Section 2.1 or
disconnected from the selected cases). In addition, Phase 3 was also used to prepare outlooks
for the future in Section 5.
This strategy was applied to analyse the documents listed in Tables 1 and 2. The results of Phases
1 and 2 are reported in Sections 4.1–4.6. In Section 4.7, Phases 1 and 2 are applied to the Directive
2001/18/EC (European Commission, 2001), as amended by Directive 2018/350 (European Commission,
2018), that describes under D.1 the nine so called ‘specific areas of risk’ to be taken into account in
the ERA of GMOs that are deliberately released into the environment.
7 https://ess.efsa.europa.eu/doi/doiweb/wg/685310
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Table 1: Reference documents for the microbial characterisation












This FEEDAP 2018 Guidance details
the steps for characterisation of
GMMs used as feed additives and
introduced the WGS analysis for RA












This statement is similar to the
FEEDAP Guidance (EFSA FEEDAP
Panel, 2018), although it covers
production organisms only, focused
on food enzyme applications












This draft (in public consultation)
provides recommendations to
applicants on how to describe the
analysis and results of WGS analysis
of microorganisms which should be
provided to EFSA in the context of
an application
GMM: genetically modified microorganisms; WGS: whole genome sequencing; RA: Risk assessment.
Table 2: Reference documents for the ERA
















Directive 2001/18/EC sets out
requirements for the environmental risk
assessment (ERA) of GMOs after their
deliberate release into the
environment. This Directive applies to
all GMOs introduced into the
environment, including GMMs. This
Directive is the basis of the GMO
Panel ERA Guidance for GM plants
(EFSA GMO Panel, 2010) and the GMO
Panel GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO
Panel, 2011)
Annex II, Section D, states that
conclusions on the potential
environmental impact in relevant
receiving environments from the release
of GMOs shall be drawn for each of the
nine points (so called ‘areas of risk’)
mentioned, based on an ERA
Section D.1 refers to GMOs other than
higher plants, such as GMMs.
Section D.2 refers to higher plants
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Reference Title Link Content
EC Directive
2018/350 (update
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of Directive 2001/18/EC
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described in the GMO Panel ERA
Guidance for GM plants (EFSA GMO
Panel, 2010)
Annex II D.2 is updated to reflect the
nine areas of risk that are described in
the GMO Panel ERA Guidance for GM
Plants (2010)
Annex II D.1, referring to the specific
areas of risk for GMMs, is not updated
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microbial products
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2.2. Horizon scan for SynBioM cases
ToR1 (and part of ToR2) was addressed with a horizon scanning. SynBio is a rapidly developing
research field resulting in new techniques likely to be used for the design of GMOs. To get an overview of
the SynBioM developments likely to enter the market in the next decade, EFSA requested a contractor
via a procurement call, to perform a horizon scanning process of SynBioM developments in the agri-food
sector. The information extracted from the review of the full text publications is presented in the external
report (van der Vlugt, 2020). The outcome of this horizon scan addressed ToR1. To create a list of cases
that fall within the current Opinion, the following inclusion criteria were used:
• Inclusion Criterion 1: Products consisting or containing viable GMOs, as defined in Commission
Directive 2001/18/EC (European Commission, 2001), therefore able to replicate and transfer
genetic material. The GMMs covered include archaea, bacteria and eukarya, as previously
agreed in the EFSA GMO Panel 2011 Guidance. Eukarya includes filamentous fungi, yeast,
protists and microscopic algae. For this mandate viruses, viroids and bacteriophages were also
included.
• Inclusion Criterion 2: Products related to ‘agri-food uses meaning agri/food/feed products
falling within the remit of EFSA’. The following types of uses and products fall within the remit
of EFSA and may include viable organisms that can be deliberately released into the
environment:
– human or animal consumption, e.g. food/feed products, probiotics, microbiome
engineering (assessed under the food, feed, novel food and health claims regulations);
– silage and feed fermentation agents;
– starter cultures, fermentation agents and biocontrol in food;
– pesticide (PPP and biocides) use, e.g. viruses including bacteriophages, bacteria or fungi
PPP inducing resistance or biocontrol agents;
– biosensors, e.g. used in food contact materials;
– bacteriophage and bacteria for food decontamination;
– plant growth promoting microorganisms, e.g. providing and mobilising nutrients or growth
factors, in rhizosphere or plant tissue.
• Inclusion Criterion 3: Products deliberately released into the environment for experimental,
scaling up or commercial reasons. The product should be meant for deliberate release or its
deliberate release is connected to its use, comprising:
– experimental stages in the laboratory, greenhouse, farm, mesocosm, field trial or food pilot
plant. All listed cases must be past the scientific proof of concept phase that merely
describe the methodology;
Reference Title Link Content
ENV/JM/MONO
(2014)2
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This Guidance also provides some
direction on how to assess potential
risks resulting from HGT are described
EFSA (2016) Guidance to develop
specific protection
goals options for ERA






This Guidance describes the
methodology to be used during an ERA
problem formulation, in order to specify
the protection goals that need to be
addressed
GMO: genetically modified microorganisms; HGT: horizontal gene transfer.
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– placing on the market. This includes greenhouse, farm, pond, field trial or feed and food
production plants and products already on the market in territories outside of the EU.
• Inclusion Criterion 4: Product possibly reaching the EU market during the next decade. This
criterion could not be derived from the literature sources itself but was scored based on the
expert judgement of the contractor.
Relevant SynBio cases were identified using a search strategy including scientific publications and
grey literature, websites demonstrating commercial activities in SynBio, databases of regulatory
agencies and iGEM projects (International Genetically Engineered Machines, www.iGEM.org). In total,
11 SynBio cases were listed as a result from the search strategy. Five cases fully passed all the
inclusion criteria. Six SynBio cases are listed separately as they do not fully match all the criteria, or
the available information was insufficient to verify that the case matched all the inclusion criteria.
During the screening, a significant number of publications was found describing the use of SynBioM
as therapeutic products for human or animal use. Details revealed that these microorganisms were
designed for medical use (e.g. vaccination), not for agro-food use. Unless further use as a novel food
or food/feed additive was mentioned, these SynBioMs were not considered.
The listed cases represent agro-food products for human and animal consumption, for use as PPP,
biosensor and fertiliser. The readiness of the cases to be introduced into the EU market during the
next decade (inclusion Criterion 4) is based on the technical advances of the product and does not
reflect the official status of the cases. These SynBioMs were constructed by making use of genetic part
libraries (i.e. the use of genetic elements) and genome editing. More advanced techniques like
xenobiology or use of minimal cells, artificial cells or protocells are not yet in use for the construction
of a SynBioM with a functionality as agro-food product. These techniques are still in an early phase of
development and successful use for constructing a SynBioM that can survive outside the laboratory will
take more time. Intensive research interest in the development of SynBioM for agro-food products is
demonstrated by the many iGEM projects and these research interests will result in more extensively
engineered SynBioM in the wider future. The horizon scan did not identify other sectors/advances in
addition to the six identified by SCENIHR, SCCS and SCHER8 (see Introduction).
Based on the horizon scan, two cases (Cases 1 and 3, see below) were selected for assessing the
adequacy of the existing EFSA Guidances for the ERA of SynBioM.
2.3. Selection of case studies
As shown in Figure 1, there is no distinct borderline between the microorganisms obtained using
existing genetic modification techniques and those derived from SynBio. Considering this lack of clarity,
four case studies were selected for Phase 2 of this Opinion, with Cases 1, 2 and 3 being part of a
continuum between classical GMM and SynBioM, and with Case 4 at the far end of the spectrum of
being least familiar.
These four case studies were considered with the aim to assess the adequacy of the existing
guidance documents in a realistic/most relevant scenario. While these four case studies helped to
focus on the current status of SynBioM developments, SynBio is rapidly evolving and therefore the
chosen cases may not be representative for all future applications. Hence the 10 years to market
timeline for ‘near-future’ SynBio developments (see ToR2) was applied with flexibility and this Opinion
covers a potentially broader timeframe (e.g. using Case 4). Additionally, the horizon scan used for this
Opinion (Van der Vlugt, 2020) was based on published information, rather than other products in
unpublished R&D stage.
From the list of cases reported in the external report delivered by the contractor (see Section 2.2),
relevant cases were selected to represent:
• different microorganisms, with a possibility to reach the market;
• different routes of exposure (intended use) and the anticipation of hazards for humans,
animals and the environment (including plants);
• high extent of genetic modification;
• major phenotypic changes or novel phenotypes.
8 The SCENIHR, SCCS and SCHER assessed six SynBio developments: 1) Genetic part libraries and methods; 2) Minimal cells and
designer chassis; 3) Protocells and artificial cells; 4) Xenobiology 5) DNA synthesis and genome editing; and 6) Citizen science
(Do-It-Yourself biology) (see Introduction).
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The reason for these selection criteria is that cases resembling (in complexity) GMOs that are
already being assessed by the EFSA Guidances, would not require an alteration of such guidance and
therefore would not be useful for the development of this Opinion.
The selected cases are as follows:
Case 1 deals with a plant virus, the Citrus tristeza virus (CTV),9 that was redesigned to express a
spinach defensin to counteract the citrus greening disease by inhibiting the phloem-limited bacterium
Candidatus Liberibacter asiaticus. The engineered virus was redesigned to express three copies of the
gene coding for spinach defensin in citrus plants while preserving its ability to infect, replicate and
spread throughout vascular tissues in citrus trees. No interaction with the Citrus genome is expected
based on the current knowledge about the CTV This SynBioM was selected from the contractor’s list
(ID 1, Datasheet A in (Van der Vlugt, 2020)).
Case 2 is selected to focus on the ERA of an organism potentially used as a biofertiliser in soil.
This case concerns the soil bacterium Klebsiella oxytoca, and its gene cluster encoding the nitrogen
fixation pathway. This case was taken from literature (Temme et al., 2012). The cluster of genes
involved in the conversion of atmospheric N2 to ammonia was redesigned and refactored by deleting
all the non-coding regions and the non-essential and regulatory genes and sequences. The codons of
selected essential genes were optimised, and the new coding regions were organised into operons and
placed under the control of synthetic parts (promoters, ribosome binding sites and terminators). The
expression of the refactored gene cluster is regulated by genetic sensors and circuits. In the SynBioM
no heterologous DNA was introduced. The possibility for market entry is not excluded at this stage, as
products sharing very similar features are already on the market outside of the EU.
Case 3 focuses on the route of exposure for humans/animals and was selected from the
contractor’s list (ID 4, Datasheet B, in (Van der Vlugt, 2020)). This describes a Saccharomyces
cerevisiae yeast that produces raspberry ketone (Lee et al., 2016) A de novo pathway to produce this
aromatic compound was constructed assembling four heterologous genes, resulting in pathway
engineering and synthetic enzyme fusion. While the published case was described to be used in wine,
the WG assumed the use in beer and assumed the uptake of viable organisms present in the final beer
product. This renders the case more useful for the present Opinion.
Case 4 includes two xenobiological variants of bacterial origin (Cases 4A and 4B). Both represent
maximum extents of non-familiarity of the genetic setup and resulting phenotypes and were taken
from literature. A general explanation on ‘xenobionts’ is given in Section 3.5 below. Case 4A describes
a bacterium with a modified DNA codon usage, which allows incorporation of the non-canonical amino
acid pyrrolysine (Pyl) by utilising the universal ‘amber’ stop codon UAA as a binding site for a modified
tRNA. As a result, the bacterial cell produces new-to-nature (‘xeno’) peptides and proteins (Acevedo-
Rocha and Budisa, 2016). It is envisioned that the organism lacks the capacity for biosynthesis of Pyl
and the respective tRNA (Tharp et al., 2018) and would therefore be auxotrophic for both. Case 4B
describes a bacterium with the same potential of producing xeno-proteins, but which would carry
instead DNA stretches of an artificial genetic polymer, i.e. a xeno-nucleic acid (XNA) with six instead of
the common four bases (A, C, G and T). The resulting xenobiont with the additional base pairs d5SICS
and dNAM (Malyshev et al., 2014) would lack the capacity to synthesise the xeno-nucleotides, and so
their replication would depend on the addition of these two XNA building blocks as growth factors. The
XNA organism would also require the growth factors described for Case 4A.
2.4. Consultation
In line with its policy on openness and transparency, EFSA consulted EU Member States and
interested parties via an online public consultation. Between April and June 2020, they were invited to
submit their comments on the draft SCER Panel Scientific Opinion. Following this consultation process,
the document was revised by the SC and the experts of its SynBioM ERA WG. The comments received
were considered and have been incorporated when appropriate. The outcome of the online public
consultation is reported in an EFSA Technical report that will be published on EFSA’s website together
with the final this Scientific Opinion.
9 Non-EU Citrus tristeza virus is considered as quarantine virus (EFSA, 2019).
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3. SynBioM-specific background
Notwithstanding the definition of SynBio, in practice, as show in Figure 1, there is not a defined
distinction between the microorganisms obtained using the established genetic modification techniques
and those derived for from SynBio approaches.
The level of genetic modification in SynBio agents or products might range from being very similar
to the ones from GM technology assessed so far or can go (far) beyond with unfamiliar characteristics
at the genotypic or phenotypic level, such as in the case of xenobionts (see below Section 3.5).
Directed or accelerated evolution, a widely used technique which works through mutagenesis and
selection, can also be used in a SynBio design framework.
The term ‘Genome editing’, although indicated by SCENIHR, SCCS and SCHER as a SynBio
development, is not specifically considered in this Opinion. Genome editing refers to a range of
techniques that edit the genome in a targeted way by inducing (site-)specific changes with or without
targeted insertion of DNA sequences (see SAM, 2017). Although genome editing is increasingly used in
SynBio, because of its capacity to ‘edit’ the genome in a targeted way, it only refers to some of the
techniques available to produce a SynBio product and is therefore not a specific topic in this Opinion.
3.1. Chassis concept
The notion of biological chassis is central to contemporary SynBio. Clarification of the terminology
and the criteria for chassis is important due to the high numbers of new species and strains proposed
as SynBio platforms, and the limited differentiation between organisms used as the recipient for
recombinant DNA (i.e. host-vector systems) and those specifically defined as a SynBio chassis.
The concept of chassis is borrowed from mechanical engineering and could be defined as follows:
‘A SynBio chassis is an engineerable and reusable biological platform with a genome encoding a
number of basic functions for stable self-maintenance, growth and optimal operation but with tasks
and signal processing components optionally edited for strengthening performance under pre-specified
environmental conditions’.10
The quest for the optimal chassis has been addressed from various perspectives. The most
common approach reported in the scientific literature is to start with a well characterised bacterium













































































































































































Modified after de Lorenzo, 2010 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/bies.201000099
Figure 1: Continuum going from natural to synthetic biology products
10 Note that the key here is optimal performance, not minimized genome size (although deletion of unnecessary functions will
cause a degree of genome reduction).
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the genome that are not necessary for growth in a given environmental context. The extant genomes
of microorganisms are populated with many DNA sequences that are dispensable and even deleterious
for the final application of the bacterium. For the time being, some of these minimised E. coli
(Umenhoffer et al., 2017), P. putida (LePrince et al., 2012; Martinez-Garcia and de Lorenzo, 2019) and
B. subtilis (Reuss et al., 2017) strains are the most efficient available chassis for the implantation of
new genetic circuits. The consequence is that a standardised chassis could allow for facilitating the risk
assessment.
The definition above implies that specific target environments and tasks may optimally require
different chassis. Moreover, the same concept indicates availability of growingly upgraded variants
derived from the same initial organism. A list of the most frequently described microbial chassis for
SynBioM in published literature is reported by Nora et al. (2019).
An approach like the one for chassis is frequently applied in the current regulated GMMs used for
the production of valuable compounds, such as enzymes, fine chemicals, amino acids and vitamins.
Most of these compounds are produced in a limited number of bacterial and fungal species (de
Lorenzo et al., 2020). It can, therefore, be anticipated that the number of feasible chassis for SynBioM
will be limited because of the demand for reusability and interoperability.
3.2. Safe-by-design, firewalls and containment strategies
The design factor in SynBioM may be higher than for established techniques of genetic
modification. This offers the possibility to address safety issues already in the ‘design–build–test–learn’
cycle. Safe-by-design is a well-known principle in mechanical engineering that aims to develop new
products by taking into account all safety aspects of the product as well as of the process from the
initial ideas through to the final product. Integration of risk assessment and risk reduction questions
during the development of the product is a key aspect of safe-by-design. This necessitates safety
awareness and a different mindset among scientists and process and product developers. The safe-by-
design approach is now also followed in biotechnologies in general and is an interesting concept for
further SynBioM developments.
It is also worthwhile considering in the design of SynBioM built-in risk reduction mechanisms that
can reduce the likelihood for horizontal gene transfer (HGT) (e.g. genetic firewalls (Schmidt, 2010) and
control the spread of synthetic genes into the environment (e.g. by auxotrophy). While these so-called
firewalls have potential for gene containment, the efficacy of individual concepts and mechanisms
should be assessed on a case-by-case basis, supported by experimental data.
3.3. Barcoding
A unique identifier is a prerequisite for any SynBioM before it may be released into the environment
for detection purposes, as required by existing legislation for GMOs. In the design of the SynBioM, it is
expected that this unique identifier has been built in as a kind of DNA barcode. Standardised
barcoding may be possible e.g. at the chassis level.
3.4. Genetic part libraries
The genetic part libraries are repository of genetic elements, engineered genes, regulatory regions
and DNA fragments with characterised properties and functions (see for example http://www.addgene.
org/synthetic-biology/). These DNA fragments are units designed for interoperability and can be
assembled in novel engineered genetic systems. Specific software tools support the design of complex
DNA sequences by combining different genetic parts (McLaughlin et al., 2018).
3.5. Xenobionts
Xenobionts are organisms made up of non-natural products. While such organisms are currently not
fully developed and viable, research efforts to generate these have been significant (Kubyshkin and
Budisa, 2017). Major targets to replace natural building blocks of cells by new-to-nature products are
proteins and nucleic acids (Anasova et al., 2016). The genetic machinery of xenobionts is refactored to
allow the insertion of rare, modified or novel amino acids, resulting in xeno-peptides or xeno-proteins
(Agostini et al., 2017). Considering the central importance of proteins and nucleic acids for any cellular
life on Earth, modifications at these levels can result in organisms with unfamiliar properties.
Xeno-proteins acting as enzymes, therapeutic agents, toxins or with other activities could have a
Scientific Opinion SynBioM MC and ERA
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 17 EFSA Journal 2020;18(10):6263
substantial potential for medical applications, industrial biotechnology or environmental engineering.
XNA can potentially extend the universal four-base genetic alphabet to a six-base code, so generating
a genetic machinery that would not be functional in natural organisms. XNA is regarded as a means of
biocontainment or a genetic firewall because it strongly limits an unintended spread and expression of
synthetic genes into natural microbiomes, while conversely it bears the potential to produce many
xeno-proteins (Acevedo-Rocha and Budisa, 2011).
In context of this document, the new-to-nature cell building blocks mainly considered included
xeno-proteins (and peptides) as well as XNAs (Cases 4A and 4B).
4. Evaluation of the adequacy of existing guidelines
This Section describes the evaluation of the adequacy of existing risk assessment guidances listed
in Tables 1 and 2. In phase 1 of such evaluation, the relevant parts of such guidances were evaluated
for adequacy. In the subsequent phase 2, the adequacy was appraised using the above SynBioM cases
1–4.
4.1. General outline to risk assessment of GMM
The risk assessment of GMMs, seeking an authorisation in EU under specific regulations, as
described in the relevant EFSA Guidances, is based on a stepwise approach that can be summarised in
three main phases:
• Microbial and molecular characterisation (Section 4.2): aimed to identify the GMM and its
parental organism and to identify and characterise related hazards (e.g. antimicrobial
resistance (AMR), virulence, pathogenicity, toxin production).
• The safety of genetic modification (Section 4.3): focused on the intended and unintended
effects of the GM and potential additional hazards derived from it.
• The ERA (Sections 4.5 and 4.7): targeted to assess potential adverse effects to humans,
animals and the environment resulting from the deliberate release of the GMM into the
environment. ERA is further complemented with Post Market Environmental Monitoring
(Section 4.6).
4.2. Microbial and molecular characterisation
4.2.1. Characterisation of the microorganism and taxonomic identification by
WGS
Phase 1: Analysis of the Chapter 2, Section 2.1 ‘Characterisation of the microorganism’
of the EFSA FEEDAP Panel Guidance 2018, and the EFSA CEP Panel Statement of 2019
Whole genome sequencing (WGS) is the preferred approach for the characterisation of the
microorganism under assessment and this is mandatory for bacteria and yeast and optional for fungi.
The WGS should be used preferentially to identify the microorganism and to document the genetic
modification. The WGS will also be searched for the presence of genes of concern as AMR genes and
virulence/toxigenic factors. As such, it forms an essential element for the risk assessment of
(genetically modified) microorganisms.
This approach is applicable to SynBioMs with some additional considerations needed:
• WGS is considered essential also in the characterisation of SynBioMs: WGS must be performed
on all SynBioMs, including those with a fungal chassis.
• It is essential that in all cases the purpose of the development of the SynBioM using a certain
chassis design must be explained.
• Guidance on the minimum set of information related to the WGS data is given in ‘EFSA
statement on the requirements for whole genome sequence analysis of microorganisms
intentionally used in the food chain’ (in preparation11). When SynBioMs would be extensively
engineered, a low degree of identity with reference genomes may be expected. For organisms
containing extra chromosomal elements such as plasmids, these sequences are also required.
11 https://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/consultation/consultation/consultation_EFSA-Statement-WGS-microorganisms.
pdf
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• For (SynBioM) micro-algae, the development of specialised guidance(s) for the interpretation of
the WGS data is recommended.
• For some SynBioM viruses, it may be required to address the high degree of sequence
variability and its relation with biological activity, for example by higher sequence depth than
for other microorganisms (further explained in Section 5.3).
• For xenobionts with modified nucleic acids, the standard WGS may not be applied. Similarly, for
xenobionts harbouring modified/rewritten genetic code, the interpretation of the WGS data could
be misleading (e.g. transformation of a stop codon in a codon for non-canonical amino acids).
Phase 1: Analysis of Chapter 2.1 ‘Taxonomic identification of GMM’ of the EFSA FEEDAP
Guidance 2018, and Chapter 1.1 of the EFSA CEP Panel Statement of 2019
The taxonomic identification of the microorganism is a prerequisite for the risk assessment and also
the basis for the application of the European Qualified Presumption of Safety (QPS) concept (see
Section 4.2.2). Identification of a microbial strain should be based on up-to-date methodologies and
current knowledge about the genus and species. It should be based on WGS for bacteria and yeast
and WGS is also preferred for filamentous fungi (Section 2.1 of the EFSA FEEDAP Guidance 2018 and
Section 1.1 of the EFSA CEP Panel statement 2019). The application of this approach to SynBioM
needs some additional considerations:
• Taxonomic identification is only relevant for a SynBioM if there is enough familiarity of the
chassis with a non-modified microorganism.
• WGS is mandatory for collecting taxonomic information of all the different building blocks of a
SynBioM organisms.
• If possible, the chassis should be taxonomically identified. If the chassis is derived from one
non-modified microorganism, the taxonomic identification can be based on the existing
guidelines. As a SynBioM chassis can consist of several building blocks, eventually modified,
the assessment needs to identify each of these blocks. For this phylogenomics of average
nucleotide identity (ANI) can be used for the chassis sequence blocks. Also, depending on the
degree of familiarity of the SynBioM with the non-modified microorganism, specific sequences
commonly used for taxonomic identification (e.g. 16S rRNA, housekeeping genes, multilocus
sequence typing (MLST)) can also be applied if these sequences are present and not or not
extensively modified. If the chassis is derived from different microorganisms and/or extensively
modified, guidance provided in Section 2.5.2 ‘Characteristics of modified sequences, Identifying
sequences’ of the FEEDAP Guidance, and Section 1.5.2 of the CEF statement; from designed
organism can be useful. In this Section, the terms ‘inserted sequences’ and ‘donor organism’
should be interpreted as building blocks and chassis. In case the data do not allow the
assignment of the SynBio chassis under assessment to a known microbial species, its
phylogenetic position with respect to the closest relatives should be provided.
• The organism should, in accordance to the guidance on GMM, be deposited in an
internationally recognised culture collection and should be kept for the authorised period of the
SynBioM.
• No guidance is present in the current EFSA guidance for the taxonomic identification of
microorganisms other than bacteria, yeast and fungi. Guidance for the taxonomic identification
Table 3: Phase 2 testing of WGS on the cases
Case Specific evaluations Conclusion on the adequacy
Updates
recommended
1–3, 4A The WGS of the organism is a
basis for the risk assessment and
the guidances can be used for this
The viral, bacterial or yeast recombinant
genome can be determined based on existing
guidances. For some SynBioM viruses, a higher
sequence depth may be required compared with
other microorganisms
None
4B The standard WGS cannot be
applied. Also, the interpretation of
the WGS is not yet covered
Sections are not adequate New tools to be
developed
WGS: whole genome sequencing; SynBioM: microorganism obtained through synthetic biology.
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of viruses is available in the QPS opinion (EFSA BIOHAZ Panel, 2020). Guidance for (SynBio)
micro-algae is recommended to be developed.
• Unequivocal taxonomical identification of most xenobionts may not be established.
4.2.2. QPS approach
Phase 1: Assessment of Chapter 1 ‘Assessment’ of the EFSA FEEDAP guidance 2018,
and Chapter 1.4.1 of the EFSA CEP Panel Statement of 2019
The Chapter describes a specific approach for the risk assessment that applies to those species of
microorganisms included in the list of recommended biological agents for the QPS status (EFSA, 2007;
EFSA BIOHAZ Panel, 2020). The QPS evaluation is based on extensive literature searches to discover
the body of knowledge and possible safety concerns for humans, animals and the environment related
to their release. Those strains qualifying for the QPS approach are presumed safe for target species,
consumer and the environment without the need for specific studies. The QPS status is also applicable
to GMMs if the recipient strain qualifies for the QPS status, and if the genetic modification does not
indicate a concern (EFSA BIOHAZ Panel, 2020). As the QPS assessment is based on the unambiguously
taxonomic identification of the microorganism and on its body of knowledge including the safety for
humans, animals and the environment, the concept, as such, is not applicable for SynBioMs.
The QPS concept is worthwhile for considering as a basis for the risk assessment of building blocks
of SynBio microorganisms (e.g. chassis, metabolic building blocks). As there are no or limited tests
available for assessing the virulence/pathogenicity/toxicity of SynBioM, the option to rely on the body
of knowledge of building blocks available in literature is valid when there is sufficient familiarity of the
SynBioM/chassis with the QPS organism. However, it should be considered that genome minimisation
may lead to new features of concern, e.g. to the loss of antigens that could render the SynBioM
invisible to the immune system, therefore altering the safety status of the organism.
4.2.3. Antimicrobial and antimycotic susceptibility
Phase 1: Assessment of the Chapter 2; Section 2.2 ‘Antimicrobial susceptibility’ of the
EFSA FEEDAP Guidance 2018; and Chapter 1.3 of the EFSA CEP Panel Statement of 2019
The FEEDAP Guidance follows the concept expressed by EFSA (EFSA BIOHAZ Panel, 2008) that
AMR is a food risk and the bacteria intentionally introduced into the food chain should not increase the
environmental load of AMR genes. This guidance based the risk assessment of AMR on the following
topics:
• The difference between acquired and intrinsic AMR. When a strain of a typically susceptible
species is resistant to a given antimicrobial drug, it is considered to have an ‘acquired
resistance’ for that compound. In contrast, intrinsic resistance to an antimicrobial is understood






1–3 The taxonomic identification is a basis of the risk
assessment
Sections are adequate None
4A, 4B Taxonomic identification for these xenobionts is not
possible
Not relevant None
Table 5: Phase 2 testing of QPS on the cases
Case Specific evaluations Conclusion on the adequacy
Updates
recommended
1, 2 QPS status of these 2 organisms has
not been assessed
QPS status for any of the building blocks could
be assessed in the frame of an application
None
3 Saccharomyces cerevisiae is a QPS
organism
QPS is valid for the risk assessment of
Saccharomyces cerevisiae
None
4A, 4B These xenobionts have strongly
limited familiarity with existing
microorganisms
The QPS concept cannot be applied None
QPS: qualified presumption of safety.
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as inherent to a bacterial species and is typical of all the strains of that species. Intrinsic AMR
is generally not considered a safety concern.
• The use of a combined approach of phenotypic testing, based on the MIC determination and
its comparison with defined cut-off values that discriminate susceptible from resistant strains,
and on WGS analysis. The cut-off values are defined for the bacteria species most commonly
notified to EFSA as feed additives.
SynBio organisms, as other microorganisms assessed by EFSA, should not add to the pool of AMR
genes already present in the gut and environmental microbiomes or otherwise increase the spread of
AMR. However, some limitations in the application of the guidance can be foreseen:
• Intrinsic vs acquired AMR (Section 2.2 of the guidance): the concept of intrinsic resistance is
strictly related to a single taxonomical unit, mostly the species. For SynBioM, the species
concept may not apply, due to wide intervention on the genome. Therefore, in that case any
AMR gene harboured by a SynBioM should be considered as a hazard.
• The application of a phenotypic test based on MIC value, as described in Section 2.2.1 of the
Guidance, may be of limited use for SynBioM. The cut-off values are determined on distribution
of MICs within a defined taxonomical unit, generally the species. For SynBioM, the species
assignation, as above reported, may be hampered by the substantial genome synthesis or
refactoring. Consequently, reference cut-off values may not be present.
Section 2.2.3 Interpretation of the results does not apply to SynBioM for the reasons above reported.
Assessment of antimycotic susceptibility
Antimycotic susceptibility testing is formulated as a QPS qualification for QPS yeast species used as
viable cells in food and feed applications. This qualification is reconfirmed in the latest QPS opinion to
be related to a safety concern (EFSA BIOHAZ Panel, 2020). A specific EFSA guidance for applicants to
comply with this requirement is not yet available.
4.2.4. Antimicrobial production
Phase 1: Assessment of the Chapter 2; Section 2.3 ‘Antimicrobial production’ of the
EFSA FEEDAP Guidance 2018
The Regulation on Feed Additive (Regulation (EC) No 429/200812) states that these agents should
not produce antimicrobials relevant for use in humans and animals and this applies also to microbial
products. The absence of antimicrobial activity should be demonstrated by testing the culture
supernatants against reference strains known to be susceptible to a range of antibiotics. If there is a
positive outcome in one or more species, the inhibitory substance should be identified.
As for other microorganisms assessed by EFSA, conventional or GMM, SynBio organisms should not
produce antimicrobials that may select in microbial environmental communities cross-resistance to
critically important antimicrobial (CIA) and highly important antimicrobial (HIA) for human medicine as
established by WHO. The approach defined by the FEEDAP Guidance (EFSA FEEDAP Panel, 2018) in










3 The presence of the AMR genes in the
engineered strain should be assessed. The




Guidance is recommended to be
developed for testing the antimycotic
resistance of SynBioM yeast
4B XNA is not expected to encode for AMR
genes functional in environmental
microorganisms
Not relevant None
AMR: antimicrobial resistance; XNA: xeno-nucleic acid.
12 Regulation (EC) No 429/2008 of 25 April 2008 on detailed rules for the implementation of Regulation (EC) No 1831/2003 of
the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the preparation and the presentation of applications and the
assessment and the authorization of feed additives (text with EEA relevance).
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Section 2.3 applies to SynBioM. An exception could be a SynBioM specifically designed to exert an
antimicrobial activity against undesirable bacteria.
4.2.5. Toxigenicity and pathogenicity
Phase 1: Assessment of the Chapter ‘Considerations of the GMM and/or its product for
human health’, of the EFSA GMO Panel GMM Guidance 2011
In the guidance, the assessment of toxigenicity and pathogenicity of SynBioM is based on three
different approaches for collecting evidence that should be used in a weight of evidence approach. The
first is based on the history of use, the body of knowledge of the strain or its close relatives mainly
performed by literature searches. The second is based on bioinformatics analysis of the WGS for the
presence of known virulence factor or toxic compounds. The third is based on testing of the
microorganism in model systems.
• The basic principle of this weight of evidence approach is in principle also applicable for
SynBioM. The degree of certainty on the safety of the SynBioM will, however, depend on the
degree of familiarity with the non-modified microorganism, because this will determine the
applicability of the existing body of knowledge to the SynBioM.
• The 2011 EFSA Guidance for risk assessment of food and feed from GMMs requests that the
toxicological assessment considers the presence and levels of newly expressed proteins, the
potential presence of other new constituents, the possible changes in the levels of endogenous
constituents beyond normal variation and the impact of other changes in composition due to
the genetic modification. These general requirements are valid also for the risk assessment of
SynBioM.
• Genotoxicity for metabolites produced by SynBioM microorganisms can be tested by several
in vitro tests using culture concentrates following Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) guidelines, referred to in several EFSA Guidances (e.g. EFSA GMO Panel,
2011; EFSA CEP Panel, 2009): the Ames test (OECD 471, 1997), chromosomal aberration test
(OECD 473, 2016a), in vitro micronucleus assay (OECD 476, 2016b). If adverse effects are
encountered in these in vitro tests, in vivo tests are necessary, and guidance is available, e.g.
in the EFSA CEF enzyme Guidance. These general requirements are valid also for the risk
assessment of SynBioM.
Table 7: Phase 2 testing of antimicrobial production on the cases
Case Specific evaluations Conclusion on the adequacy
Updates
recommended
1 Viruses by nature have a biocidal
activity on specific organisms/cells.
However, viruses do not produce
compounds that can induce cross-
resistance to clinically relevant
antimicrobials
Not relevant None
2 The production of antimicrobial
compounds in K. oxytoca should be
assessed
Section is adequate None
3 The considered yeast, S. cerevisiae,
does not produce antimicrobial
compounds, unless specific pathways
are introduced during the SynBioM
design
Not relevant for yeasts, unless the genetic
determinants for antimicrobial compounds
are inserted in the SynBioM
None
4A, 4B Xenobionts can produce both known
and/or new compounds with
antimicrobial activity
Section is partially adequate. Phenotypic
testing against the list of reference bacteria
is applicable
WGS interrogation for antimicrobial
compound production pathways is not




SynBioM: microorganism obtained through synthetic biology; WGS: whole genome sequencing.
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• The assessment of the virulence/pathogenicity of a SynBioM will, due to a lack of suitable
model testing systems, mainly rely on the body of knowledge and the bioinformatics analysis
of the WGS for virulence factors. Even in the absence of known virulence factors it may be
difficult to exclude the virulence/pathogenicity of a totally new SynBioM with little or no
familiarity to natural microorganisms. Suitable model systems are recommended to be
developed to bridge this gap in the assessment. This is especially the case for xenobionts due
to their ‘new-to-nature’ characteristics, for which the body of knowledge will be limited or not
existing.
• Guidance is missing for testing the toxigenicity and virulence/pathogenicity of SynBioM micro-
algae and for testing of virulence/pathogenicity of viruses (viruses do not produce toxins but
are often pathogenic by taking over the cell machinery of infected cells).
The following information may complement the above assessment for completeness purposes.
However, the mentioned guidelines will be investigated in depth during Work Package 3 under this
mandate. The issue of toxigenicity and pathogenicity (including intracellular replication and interaction
with the human genome) is addressed in other guidelines, e.g. the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (US EPA13) published specific microbial guidances for testing toxicity/pathogenicity/
virulence of microorganisms used as pesticide. The same guidances are also referred to in the EC
Regulation for microbial PPPs part B from 283/2013 (for PPPs) and 284/2013 (for active substances
used in PPPs) based on requirements documented in the European Commission regulation. In these
regulations, the requirements are detailed for assessing the effects on human health in a TIER I and
TIER II approach, in which TIER II has only to be conducted if the TIER I has shown adverse effects.
4.2.6. Impact on gut microbiota
Phase 1: Analysis of the Chapter 4 (Sections 4.1 and 4.2) ‘Impact on gut microbiota’ of
the EFSA FEEDAP Guidance of 2018
This Section is aimed to assess if the feed additive has an impact on gut microbiota, by examining
whether its use results in an overgrowth or shedding of potentially pathogenic microorganisms. This
requirement applies only to: i) the feed additives that showed an adverse effect related to digestive
tract disturbances in the animal studies; ii) to those for which an adverse effect on the gut microbiota
can be anticipated (e.g. antimicrobial activity); or iii) to those designed to reduce numbers of
enteropathogens. No additional appraisals (e.g. a wider effect on the gut microbiome), other than the
colonisation and shedding of microbial pathogens, are required.
This approach is not applicable to SynBioMs, unless the use of these microorganisms falls under the
three above provisions.
Moreover, the impact on gut microbiota will be specifically addressed in a further Work package for
this mandate (WP3), covering the food/feed aspects of microorganisms derived from SynBio
approaches.





1 The CTV virus must be assessed
for toxigenicity and pathogenicity
The Section is not
adequate
Guidance for SynBio viruses for the aspects
of MC and ERA (including the assessment
of impact on plants and insects health)
2, 3 The toxigenicity and pathogenicity





4A and 4B Lack of familiarity with existing
microorganisms
The Section is not
adequate
Suitable model systems for xenobionts
MC: microbial characterisation; ERA: environmental risk assessment.
13 Acute oral toxicity/pathogenicity US EPA 712-C-96-315 (US EPA, 1996a) OPPTS 885.3050; Acute pulmonary toxicity/
pathogenicity; exposure by inhalation or intratracheal injection US EPA 712-C-96-318 (US EPA, 1996b) OPPTS 885.3150; Acute
injection intraperitoneally or subcutaneously US EPA 712-C-96–318 (US EPA, 1996b) OPPTS 885.3200; Virulence/pathogenicity
in cell cultures for assessing intracellular replicating microorganisms US EPA 712-C-96–321 (US EPA, 1996c) OPPTS 885.3500;
Subchronic/systemic toxicity/pathogenicity by 28–90 days study US EPA 712-C-96–232 (US EPA, 1996d) OPPTS 885.3600.
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4.3. Safety of the genetic modification
4.3.1. FEEDAP Guidance and CEF Statement as basis of the assessment
Phase 1: Analysis of the Chapter ‘Purpose of genetic modification and description of
WGS as a basis for characterisation – Characterisation of the microorganism’ of the EFSA
FEEDAP Guidance 2018 (Chapter 2; Section 2.5); and CEF statement Chapter 1.5
The EFSA FEEDAP Panel, (EFSA FEEDAP Panel, 2018) Guidance for the microbial characterisation
bases the risk assessment of the genetic modification of bacteria and yeasts on the analysis of WGS.
So, this analysed Section of the GMM Guidance focuses on the following topics:
• The purpose of the genetic modification should be described.
• The characterisation of the structure of the genetic modification should be carried out using
WGS data for bacteria and yeasts and is recommended for filamentous fungi.
• When the WGS of a fungal GMO is not available, all the steps to obtain the genetic
modification should be described and identification of all genetic material potentially introduced
into the recipient/parental microorganism is required.
The WGS-based risk assessment of the genetic modification is considered suitable for the risk
assessment of SynBioMs, to detect genes of concern and to predict HGT (e.g. location on mobile
elements, plasmids, transposons, etc.). However, some modifications in the application of the guidance
can be foreseen:
• Characteristics of the modified sequences ((EFSA FEEDAP Panel, 2018) Chapter 2,
Section 2.5.1). The Section ‘DNA from defined donor organisms’ may not be suitable for
extensively engineered SynBioM. Therefore, more information should be provided on the
sequence design for SynBioM. Particular attention should be paid to genes of concern, such as
genes encoding AMR, toxins and virulence factors.
• Structure of the genetic modification based on WGS ((EFSA FEEDAP Panel, 2018); Chapter 2,
Section 2.5.2). This Section is relevant for all SynBioM, including eukaryotic organisms.
Additional aspects of SynBioM risk assessment of the genetic modification, such as those dealing
with genetic parts and designer chassis, are not completely addressed by the FEEDAP Guidance
(2018). So, some Sections are also taken from the EFSA GMO Panel Guidance (2011) analysed below.
4.3.2. GMO Guidance on characteristics of the recipient strain
Phase 1: Analysis of ‘Characteristics of the recipient or (when appropriate) parental
organism’ (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011, Chapter III; Section B, 1.1)
Below are the evaluations of Sub-Sections from the GMO Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011) that
address additional topics not covered above in Section 4.3.1. These are the following Sub-Sections:
1.1.2 on phenotypic and genetic markers for the GMM; 1.1.4 on identification and detection techniques
of the GMM; 1.1.5 on source and natural habitat of the parental microorganism; 1.1.6 on transfer of
genetic material to other microorganisms; 1.1.7 on genetic stability of the GMM; 1.1.8 on the
pathogenicity, ecological and physiological traits and 1.1.9 on the history of use.
Sub-Section 1.1.2 describes guidance for the characterisation of phenotypic and genetic markers.
For the ERA assessment of SynBioM, relevant phenotypic features should be determined. For these
features, the Sub-Section 1.1.2 of the EFSA GMO Panel 2011 Guidance is adequate and can be
extended to features which can be relevant. The relevance and therefore the choice of the parameters
to be characterised will depend on the SynBioM to be assessed and in which degree the comparative
approach to the non-modified organism can be applied. Therefore, for certain xenobionts, due to their
modification with new-to-nature components, this phenotypic characterisation according to the
guidance could be of no relevance.
Sub-Section 1.1.5 describes guidance for the required information on the source and natural habitat
of the parental microorganism. Information on the natural habitat of the organism from which the
chassis of the SynBioM has been derived is useful to include in the ERA assessment if there is still
enough familiarity with the non-modified organism. The data could be provided following the guidance
described in Sub-Section 1.1.5.
Sub-Section 1.1.6 describes guidance on the required information to assess the transfer of genetic
material to other microorganisms and is considered adequate for SynBioMs. The characterisation of the
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SynBioM includes the identification of mobile genetic elements and the properties for which they code
(e.g. AMR, virulence factors, toxins). These elements, and the open reading frames they contain, need
to be identified based on the WGS. The mobile elements and their host range should be documented
as indicated in Sub-Section 1.1.6 if the specificity has deliberately changed in relation to the designed
purpose of the SynBioM (e.g. genetic material intended to be spread to an extended host range) this
should be clearly characterised, eventually experimentally confirmed. The new mobilising properties or
newly designed mobile genetic systems need to be incorporated in the existing databases so that they
become available for the EU and for the bioinformatics analysis of the WGS of other SynBioM. In Sub-
Section 1.4.6 from the guidance from the EFSA GMO Panel (2011), complementary guidance is
provided that could be useful for SynBioM, as are the presence of sequences within the SynBioM that
could enhance or modify gene transfer or integration of the trait into the genome of other
microorganisms, and the presence of genes in the GMM that could provide selective advantage to
other microorganisms as a consequence of unintentional gene transfer.
Sub-Section 1.1.7 describes guidance on how to assess the genetic stability that can be applied on
the SynBioM. Information on the genetic stability of the SynBioM should be provided for the strain at
the premarket phase. This needs to be based on the comparison of the WGS of the SynBioM before
and after large-scale fermentation. Other fingerprinting techniques as mentioned in Sub-Section 1.1.7
are insufficiently sensitive. In Sub-Section 1.1.7, several aspects in relation to stability/instability of the
SynBioM are missing. If instability is occurring, it would need to be documented how this would affect
the phenotype. For SynBioM designed to be intentionally instable (e.g. to go to suicide in certain
conditions), the instability changes in relation to environmental conditions should be documented.
Conversely, mechanisms specifically designed to enhance the genetic stability of the SynBioM (e.g.
modifications in recombination system) should be characterised.
Sub-Section 1.1.8 describes guidance for the required information on the pathogenicity, ecological
and physiological traits and is considered adequate for SynBioMs. The pathogenicity, ecological and
physiological traits of the SynBioM should be addressed. The toxigenic and virulence/pathogenic
potential should be documented with the whole human population in mind. The information of the
ability to colonise plants, animals or humans should be provided (following bullet point 3 of this
Section) but also the wider environment should be included. The involvement of the SynBioM (chassis)
in environmental processes should be provided as mentioned in bullet point 4 of this Section. As for
SynBioM organisms with limited familiarity, literature surveys and database searches would not suffice,
and experimental work using model systems could be necessary. The information requested in this
Section should be extended to the information on the intended effects of the SynBioM that could be
the colonisation of a certain environmental niche and the execution of a probiotic or
immunomodulatory effect. The guidance for testing the efficacy of the intended effects of the SynBioM
is out of the scope of this Opinion and should be addressed by the specific guidances related to the
requirements of the specific legislation under which the assessment is performed.
The characterisation of pathological, ecological and physiological traits as mentioned in Sub-
Section 1.1.8 should be better addressed in the ERA Section and not in the characterisation of the organism.
Sub-Section 1.1.9 describes guidance how to describe the history of use. It is significant that any
information on previous uses or releases of the SynBioM or organisms based on the same basic chassis
should be provided, including literature references or other documentation. Emphasis should be placed
on information that relates to possible impacts on human or animal health or the environment.
4.3.3. GMO Guidance on the origin of inserted sequences
Phase 1: Analysis of the Chapter ‘Characteristics of the origin of the inserted
sequences [donor organism(s)]’ (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011; Chapter III; Section B; 1.2); the
Chapter ‘Characteristics of the modified sequences – Inserted sequences’ (EFSA FEEDAP
Panel, 2018, Chapter 2.5.2; Section 2.5); and CEF statement Chapter 1.5.2
The Chapters are subdivided into sequences from defined donor organisms, synthetic DNA or
nucleic acids from environmental samples. These Sections are applicable when sequences are inserted
(or implanted) in a chassis of a SynBioM. The source and function of the inserted sequences are
important to determine potential toxicity, virulence or allergenicity of the gene product for humans,
animals, plant health and the environment, but also to determine other traits that are significant for
survival and competition of the SynBioM in the environment in the niches where it is introduced or can
spread to. The part on designed sequences would be most applicable for SynBioM. For xenobionts, the
text should include also the term XNA instead of only referring to DNA.
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4.3.4. GMO Guidance on information on the GMM
Phase 1: Analysis of ‘Information on the GMM’ (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011; Chapter III;
Section B; 1.4)
The GMM Guidance focuses on the rate and level of expression of gene products as results of the
genetic modification. Three different topics are considered:
• the condition affecting gene expression;
• the cellular localisation of the recombinant proteins (e.g. intracellular, secreted);
• for enzymes, the function and mode of action.
This approach has some limitations for the assessment of SynBioM. While most of the GMM are
designed to express a single trait (e.g. enzyme production, vitamin pathway, production of a single
amino acid), the SynBio approach is generally targeted to re-design metabolic pathways, substantially
affecting many cellular functions and not a single gene product. Therefore, the approach of the
guidance may not fully be adequate because a comparative approach could for specific cases no
longer be sufficient.
4.4. Concluding remarks for microbial and molecular characterisation
and safety of the genetic modification
Concluding remarks for Sections 4.2 and 4.3:
• For the microbial (genotypic and phenotypic) characterisation of SynBioM and the safety of the
genetic modification, the FEEDAP Guidance on microbial characterisation (EFSA FEEDAP Panel,
2018), the CEP statement (EFSA CEP Panel, 2019) and the GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel,
2011) are useful as a basis for the assessment.
• Adequacy of the existing EFSA Guidances for SynBioM depends on the degree of familiarity of
the chassis with the non-modified microorganism. The extent to which the existing body of
knowledge on the microorganism can be used in the risk assessment will be higher when there
is a high degree of familiarity with the chassis. The following guidance is adequate and
sufficient in this context:
– WGS analysis, essential for SynBioM, irrespective of them being bacteria, archaea, viruses,
viroids or eukaryotic microorganisms such as protists, fungi and micro-algae.






1–2-3 The chassis is well known, origin and function of the
insert is known; there is familiarity with the sequence
of the non-modified organism
Section is adequate None















4A and 4B Xenobionts based on DNA coding can still be sequenced
by conventional methodology and the sequence can,
based on the degree of novel amino acids to be built in,
related to biological functioning, e.g. by searching for
genes of concern as AMR genes and genes potentially
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– Explaining the purpose of the development of the SynBioM using a certain chassis is
essential.
– WGS for taxonomic identification, identification of antimicrobial resistance genes, searching
sequences related to antimicrobial production, toxigenic and virulence/pathogenic
characteristics, mobile genetic elements and characterisation of the genetic modifications
of the SynBioM.
– QPS concept for the risk assessment of building block of SynBio microorganisms (e.g.
chassis, metabolic building blocks);
– phenotypic testing for the production of antimicrobial compounds;
– weight of evidence approach for the assessment of toxigenicity and pathogenicity based
on bioinformatics analysis, body of knowledge and the use of model systems;
– need for collecting information on the source and natural habitat of the recipient
microorganism;
– possibility of transfer of genetic material to other microorganism;
– genetic stability;
– pathogenicity, ecological and physiological traits;
– history of use;
– rate and level of expression of gene products resulting from the genetic modification;
– need for a unique identifier.
• The following guidance and knowledge is recommended to be developed for microbial and
molecular characterisation of SynBioM as well as for GMMs:
– for micro-algae: specialised guidance for genomic and phenotypic characterisation;
– for yeast and fungi: phenotypic testing for antimycotic resistance;
– for xenobionts: guidance not based on history of use and not solely based on the
comparative approach for the new-to-nature components;
– for XNA: guidance for characterisation and detection;
– for xenobionts: extensively engineered SynBioM, micro-algae and viruses, suitable model
systems for testing virulence and pathogenicity for non-target hosts.
4.5. Environmental risk assessment
The ERA focuses on potential adverse effects resulting from the interaction between the SynBioM
and its receiving environment, including biotic and abiotic components. The genotoypic and phenotypic
characterisation of the SynBioM are significant elements for the ERA as these data can be used to
make assumptions on the behaviour of the SynBioM in the receiving environment and its potential
interactions.
The following Sections take into consideration the original EFSA Guidance documents, specifically
developed for food/feed uses, as well as Directive 2001/18/EC (European Commission, 2001) which
deals with deliberate release of GMOs in the environment. This Directive is amended by Directive
2018/350 (European Commission, 2018) to reflect the terminology used in the EFSA Guidance on ERA
of GM plants (EFSA GMO Panel, 2010) such as the use of the term ‘area of risk’ (Table 1). These
‘specific areas of risk’ described in Directive 2001/18/EC have not been explicitly addressed in the GMM
Guidance of the GMO Panel in 2011. This is because this document was drafted to cover food feed
uses of viable microorganisms (Category 4) only and does not cover the wider range of uses to be
covered within the scope of this current Opinion.
Hence, for this Opinion, the text of the guidance has been considered also addressing ‘specific
areas of risk’ as mentioned in Directive 2001/18/EC, Annex II (D.1) (European Commission, 2001) and
taking in consideration, for each ‘specific areas of risk’, the five steps in ERA as described by the EFSA
Guidance on ERA for GM plants, GMO Panel, 2010 (problem formulation including hazard identification,
hazard characterisation, exposure characterisation, risk characterisation, risk management strategies).
For each ‘specific areas of risk’, several pathways to harm are described, considering all the receiving
environments that a SynBio organism may enter or spread to.
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4.5.1. Principles and strategies for risk assessment of genetically modified
microorganisms
Phase 1: Assessment of Chapter II of EFSA GMO Panel, 2011
The Chapter deals with:
• objective of the ERA
• categorisation of the GMMs and their products (Categories 1–4)
• comparative approach
• unintended effects.
All the elements mentioned are equally applicable to SynBioM as for viable GMMs, with the possible
exception for the comparative approach (see Section 4.5.2). As for GMMs, unintended effects of
SynBioM may occur as a side-effect of the newly introduced trait(s) and/or of the genetic modification
techniques applied.
This Chapter is applicable to SynBioMs, subject to the following considerations:
• Objective of the risk assessment: The definitions of risk assessment should be checked if they
are in line with those of Directive 2001/18/EC (European Commission, 2001).
• Categorisation of the GMMs and their products: Only the part on viable GMM (Category 4) is
relevant for this Opinion as the GMM Categories 1–3 do not concern products containing viable
GMMs.
4.5.2. Comparative approach
Phase 1 Assessment of the Chapter on ‘Principles and strategies for risk assessment of
GMMs’ (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011; Chapter II)
The Section of the Chapter focuses on the comparative approach as a key general principle in the
ERA of GMMs. As SynBioMs may be extensively modified or redesigned, the comparative approach may
not equally be sufficient for SynBioMs. Therefore, a revision of the Section is recommended to include
the following aspects:
• According to the GMM Guidance, effects of the GMM are compared with those of the non-GMM
that is applied under similar conditions. A comparator for the ERA of GMMs is therefore
generally considered to be the non-GM microorganism. For SynBioMs, this may no longer be
sufficient in specific cases with new-to-nature components. In those cases, other comparators
could be used, such as strains derived from the same chassis with similar traits or
functionalities or comparable GMMs/SynBioMs with a history of (safe) use for similar
applications (familiarity). Comparators should be selected on a case-by-case basis and
depending on the purpose of the test. The choice of the comparator should be explained.
• The lack of a comparator may trigger requirements for extra data to conclude on potential
adverse effects on human and animal health, and the environment according to the aspects
mentioned in Annex II of the Directive 2001/18/EC (D.1) (European Commission, 2001).
Table 11: Phase 2 testing of principles and strategies for risk assessment of GMMs (as per the




Conclusion on the adequacy Updates recommended
1–4 All are Category 4
GMMs
Partly adequate, only text with respect
to general principles of ERA, text on
Category 4 organisms and on (un)
intended effects is adequate
Broaden the scope beyond food and
feed use (and refer to Directive
2001/18/EC as relevant legislation)
(European Commission, 2001)
GMM: genetically modified microorganisms; ERA: environmental risk assessment.
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4.5.3. Potential environmental impact of GMMs and their products
Phase 1: Analysis of the EFSA GMO Panel 2011, Chapter III, Section B, 4
The Chapter describes that the ERA of GMMs and its products should be performed in line with the
requirements laid down in Directive 2001/18/EC (European Commission, 2001). This part is equally
applicable to viable SynBioMs:
• Evaluation of GMM/products belonging to Categories 1–4 is described in Sections 4.1, 4.2 and
4.3 of the EFSA GMO Panel (2011) Guidance. Only aspects related to Category 4 GMMs are
applicable for the scope of this Opinion as SynBioMs, like Category 4 GMMs, are living
organisms. Aspects related to Category 3 are only relevant with respect to potential transfer of
DNA (or XNA) from the SynBioMs to the receiving environment.
• As applications of SynBioMs are expected to be broader than only for food/feed, the
description of this Section should be more general to also include other applications of
SynBioMs in the area of the EFSA remit. Therefore, also other exposure routes and receiving
environments need to be considered in the pathways to harm, such as the compartment air
and water (aquatic systems).
• The text should be revised to specifically address all the ‘specific areas of risk’ as mentioned in
Directive 2001/18/EC, Annex II (D.1) (European Commission, 2001) and make use of the
concept of ecosystem services to derived operational protection goals, as mentioned in EFSA
Scientific Committee (2016).
In addition, the text should be updated to include terminology for ERA according to the amended
Annex II of Directive 2001/18/EC.
Phase 2: Analysis of the four case studies confirmed the outcome of Phase 1.
4.5.4. Environmental hazard identification and characterisation
Phase 1: Analysis of the Chapter ‘Evaluation of products belonging to Category 3’
(EFSA GMO Panel, 2011; Chapter III; Section B; 4.2)
The Section focuses on the ERA of HGT, e.g. recombinant DNA released from GMMs, on the
potential for transfer of this recombinant DNA to other (micro-)organisms in the receiving environment
and potential adverse effects resulting from this transfer.
This Section is also applicable to SynBioMs, released into the environment, containing DNA but not
to genetic elements containing xeno-nucleotides (see Phase 2 table below).
Adverse effects resulting from HGT is one of the areas of risk as mentioned in Directive 2001/18/EC
(European Commission, 2001) (see below) and is further addressed in Section 4.7.3 ‘Horizontal gene
transfer’.
Table 12: Phase 2 testing of principles and strategies for risk assessment of GMMs (comparative
approach) on the cases
Case Specific evaluations Conclusion on the adequacy Updates recommended
1–3 For all cases, a comparator
exists in nature





that do not exist in nature
The comparative approach is not
sufficient for such components
Risk assessment of new-to-nature
SynBioM or components that do not
rely on data of non-modified
counterparts
SynBioM: microorganism obtained through synthetic biology.
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Phase 1: Analysis of ‘Evaluation of products belonging to Category 4’ (EFSA GMO
Panel, 2011; Chapter III; Section B; 4.3)
The Section focuses on the aspects to be considered in the ERA of viable GMMs of Category 4:
• characterisation of GMM-receiving environments;
• potential of the GMMs to survive and proliferate in receiving environments;
• possible interactions of GMMs with their abiotic and biotic environments including indigenous
microorganisms, plants and animals;
• horizontal gene transfer (HGT).
This Chapter of the guidance on Category 4 is equally applicable to SynBioMs.
Phase 2: Analysis of the four case studies confirmed the findings of Phase 1.
4.5.5. Exposure – information related to the product
Phase 1: Assessment of ‘Principles and strategies for risk assessment of genetically
modified microorganisms’ (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011; Chapter II)
No details are provided in the existing guidance on how to perform exposure assessments of GMMs
after their environmental release. In case of deliberate release, as is the topic of this Opinion, the
release rate, the way and frequency of application and formulation will determine initial exposure
levels. The subsequent exposure levels will be affected by the capacity of the microorganisms to
survive, persist and invade. This equally applies to SynBioMs.
Table 13: Phase 2 testing of potential HGT of the SynBioM cases
Case Specific evaluations Conclusion on the adequacy
Updates
recommended
1 This general Section is also
applicable to viruses
Adequate None
2–3 None Adequate None
4A The organism contains a new
reprogrammed codon in the
DNA: Instead of ‘Stop’ it
instructs the insertion of a
new-to-nature amino acid.
The chemical composition of
the DNA is not changed
If stretches of homologous DNA sequences occur in
natural microorganisms, the DNA of the xenobiont
can be subjected to double homologous
recombination (DHR) as foreseen for other GMMs.
However, due to the reprogrammed codon usage,
such genes from the xenobiont would not be
equally functional in natural recipients and so, the
likelihood of providing a selective advantage to
recipients is generally lower for xenobionts of this
type
None
4B The organism contains XNA,
i.e. nucleic acids with two
additional new-to-nature
bases, so extending the
genetic alphabet from a four-
letter to a six-letter code
XNA will not find natural counterparts for
homologous recombination in natural
environments. So, the probability of gene transfer
by DHR should be zero, as proposed by the
‘genetic firewall’ concept. However, if the XNA also
includes genomic regions of > 200 bp sequences
with only the natural four bases, such genetic
regions may have a potential for DHR. If these
flank regions with XNA, XNA elements may transfer
to natural recipients. In the recipient, XNA would
not be replicated due to the requirement for the
new-to-nature bases as building blocks. So, the
transfer would be without consequences.
Uncertainties remain for the potential of a natural
recipients to assimilate XNA sequences to DNA by
replacing the unnatural bases by A, C, G or T, so
generating new genes that could replicate in the
natural hosts and provide a new function
The guidances on HGT are applicable
Detection of XNA
and assessing the
efficacy of a genetic
firewall.
GMM: genetically modified microorganisms; XNA: xeno-nucleic acid.
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Due to limited knowledge about the specific performance of microorganisms in high diversity of
environmental microhabits, it is often difficult to make predictions about their environmental fate.
Under Directive 2001/18/EC (European Commission, 2001) the potential of persistence or invasiveness
of the GMM must be assessed (see Section 4.7.1) and is likely to include measurements of GMM
population levels over time. This is also applicable to SynBioMs.
Phase 2: Analysis of the four case studies confirmed the outcome of Phase 1.
Phase 1: Analysis of ‘Information on the product’ (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011; Chapter III;
Section B; 2)
The type of product will determine the route and the level of exposure of the environment to the
product. This Section of the GMM Guidance deals with the characteristics of the products introduced in
the market and mainly focuses on GMMs belonging to Categories 1, 2 and 3. Therefore, several parts
of this Section do not apply to SynBioMs intended to be deliberately released as viable cells in the
environment. The topics considered pertinent for the risk assessment of SynBioMs are the following:
• Information on the production and product preparation process: the details on these
processes, the possible related hazard and risk mitigation measures should be described.
• Description of the product and designation of the product.
• Intended use and mode of action.
• Composition and physical properties: this information, including the number of viable cells/g,
should be given.
The paragraph ‘Considerations of the GMM and/or its product for human health’ addresses the
subject discussed in Section 4.2.5 Toxigenicity and Pathogenicity. This Section applies to SynBioMs.
Phase 2: Although such information is only available for case number 1, and not for the others,
we consider the existing guidance adequate.
4.6. Post-market monitoring
The development of a specific detection method needs to be carried out for any viable GMM that
will be introduced into the environment, as a requirement under Directive 2001/18/EC (European
Commission, 2001). Detection of the GMM may also be necessary for post-market monitoring, which is
aimed to detect potential adverse effects on human health, animal health and the environment as a
consequence of the release. This will equally apply to SynBioMs that will be released into the
environment.
4.6.1. Detection
Phase 1: Assessment of Chapter ‘Description of identification and detection techniques’
(EFSA GMO Panel, 2011; III; Section B; 1.1.4)
Chapter 1.1.4 describes guidance for the development of identification and detection techniques for
GMMs that can be applied to SynBioMs. The SynBioM needs to be easily detectable in samples from
the environments in which it is released. The guidance provided in Section 1.1.4 can be used for this.
For this, a unique genetic signature should be available in the SynBioM. The detection method should
reach a sufficient sensitivity and should be validated for different relevant environmental samples.
For xenobionts, it can be challenging to provide a suitable sensitive detection method because of
the xeno-DNA structure. If the organism cannot multiply in the environment because of a lack of
suitable nucleotides/enzymes, the detection method can be of no practical relevance.
Further information will not be provided on detection, as this is outside the remit of EFSA.
Traceability is outside the remit of EFSA.
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4.6.2. Post-market environmental monitoring for use of the GMM
Phase 1: Assessment of the Chapter EFSA GMO Panel, 2011; III; Section E
This Section describes the obligation to implement a post-market environmental monitoring plan
(PMEM) under Regulation 1829/2003 according to Annex VII of Directive 2001/18/EC (European
Commission, 2001) for products consisting or containing viable GMMs. PMEM is meant to identify any
direct or indirect, immediate and/or delayed adverse effects of GMMs of Category 4 on human health
and the environment after the GMM has been placed on the market. Two types of monitoring are
described, e.g. case-specific monitoring and general surveillance, the ways to perform this monitoring
and to report on the results. As SynBioMs are viable microorganisms, this Section on PMEM also
applies to SynBioMs. The PMEM is focused on potential adverse effects of any viable GMM, irrespective
of the extent of modification or re-design. The text is recommended to be revised on one aspect:
Reference to Regulation EC No 1829/2003 should be broadened to also include a wider range of uses
of viable SynBioMs, other than food/feed uses alone.
The aspects of uncertainties as flagged up during product-specific risk assessments and according
to the guidance of the EFSA SC to report uncertainties is tightly linked to PMEM. A case-specific
monitoring plan needs to be supplied in case of uncertainties linked to the risk hypotheses used or
linked to effects that may occur only after large-scale application. General surveillance is a prerequisite
for all GMO applications. This surveillance is meant to detect potential adverse effects of the GM
application that are not foreseen in the ERA and therefore addresses uncertainties related to, for
example, indirect or long-term effects of GMOs.
4.7. Analysis of ‘specific areas of risk’ from Directive 2001/18/EC
One of the general suggestions for updates in the ERA part of the EFSA GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO
Panel, 2011) for SynBioMs, as well as for GMMs, was to broaden the scope beyond food and feed uses
(see Section 4.5). To address this, reference is made to Directive 2001/18/EC (European Commission,
2001), as amended by Directive 2018/350 (European Commission, 2018), that describes ‘specific areas
of risk’ to be taken into account in the ERA of GMOs that are deliberately released into the
environment for all uses.
Table 14: Phase 2 testing of “detection” on the cases
Case Specific evaluations Conclusion on the adequacy Updates recommended
1 to 4A Unique genetic signature can be
derived from the recombinant DNA
fragments spanning the junction of
the inserted gene. Suitable
detection techniques may need to
be adapted for these cases in
relation to the relevant
environments
The Section requesting a unique
genetic signature and suitable
detection methods for the different
relevant environments is applicable
None
4B The XenoSynBio organisms contain
unnatural nucleotides. Methods
developed for detection at the
DNA level may not be fully
applicable to XNA to detect a
unique genetic signature
The Section requesting a unique
genetic signature is applicable
Detection methods should be
made available but can be
challenging to provide
because of the xeno-DNA
structure
XNA: xeno-nucleic acid.




Conclusion on the adequacy Updates recommended
1–4 None Adequate, it concerns Category 4
organisms, so a PMEM plan can
and must be supplied
None, but as there are no prior PMEM plans under
the Directive, Part C for microorganism deliberately
released in the environment, this may still raise
practical questions from the applicant
PMEM: post-market environmental monitoring.
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In the below Sections, for each area of risk as defined in this Directive, an overview is given of the
problem formulation, examples of pathways to harm and, if applicable, recommendations for updating
ERA guidance or test methods are indicated. These are equally applicable for SynBioMs as for GMMs.
The same methodological approach (phases 1 and 2) used for the appraisal of EFSA guidance was
applied in this Section.
4.7.1. Persistence and invasiveness, including selective advantage
Upon release, SynBioMs may survive and persist in a receiving environment or invade new
environmental niches where they may exert biotic or abiotic interactions.
4.7.1.1. Problem formulation and examples of pathway to harm
A SynBioM may have adverse effects on microbiologically mediated ecosystem services by displacing
native microorganisms in ecological niches to which they spread. This displacement can be a result of
utilising more efficiently nutrients for growth or producing metabolites that inhibit indigenous
microorganisms, e.g. releasing antimicrobial agents or changing the pH. Conversely, the SynBioM may
not provide the ecosystem functions of the organisms they displace, so losing the potential, for example,
to degrade a pesticide, transform a nitrogenous compound such as ammonium efficiently, lose plant
symbiontic partners such as mycorrhiza or rhizobia, or inhibit suppressors of plant pathogens.
4.7.1.2. Adequacy of guidance and methods
Potential risks as a consequence of persistence and invasiveness are not explicitly addressed in the
EFSA GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011). Information on how to fill this gap may be derived
from the Chapter ‘Fate and survival’ in the OECD guidance to the environmental safety evaluation of
microbial biocontrol agents ENV/JM/MONO (2012)1.14
The GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011) also does not mention methods to measure potential
persistence and invasiveness of GMMs, nor does it give endpoints to measure. This also applies to
SynBioMs.
In Commission Regulation (EU) No. 283/2013, Annex part B on non-GM microorganisms as PPP
(European Commission, 2013) is stated that data should be supplied on ‘persistence and
multiplication’. If the application of a microbiological biocontrol agent is not expected to increase the
natural ‘background’ levels of the species or related species, risks may be considered acceptable or
‘not deviating’ from ‘normal’. In the OECD document on ERA of (non-GM) microbial biocontrol agents
ENV/JM/MONO (2012)1, the key aspect of the assessment is the determination of background level of
the biocontrol agent. Considering there is no background level of indigenous SynBioMs present in the
environment, the relevance of this document in the context of SynBioM risk assessment is limited.
No official OECD tests/methods are available to measure persistence and invasiveness of
microorganisms. In ENV/JM/MONO(2012)1 is stated that it is not feasible to develop standardised
methods specifying the minimum number of different conditions, soils, application timings and
samplings. This approach is considered to be not practicable (ENV/JM/MONO(2012)1).
Taking into account the specific features and extended applications of SynBioMs (traceability,
diversity of receiving environment, potential for invasion), future risk assessments would benefit from
new methods to test, model and so predict the survival, persistence and invasiveness of a SynBioM
under a range of environmental conditions. These may include high-throughput laboratory testing
methods, standardised microcosms and integration of complex environmental models.
Phase 2: For Cases 1–4, no additional aspects need to be mentioned with respect to risk
assessment associated with persistence and invasiveness.
4.7.2. Selective advantage or disadvantage
Any selective advantage or disadvantage conferred to the SynBioM and the likelihood of this
occurring under the conditions of the proposed release(s). This area of risk is taken together with area
of risk ‘persistence and invasiveness’, in accordance with the EFSA GM ERA plant Guidance (EFSA GMO
Panel, 2010).
14 See http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=env/jm/mono(2012)1&doclanguage=en.
In ENV/JM/MONO/(2019)8, Experiences are described form OECD countries dealing with assessment of microbial products.
See: http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=env/jm/mono(2019)8&doclanguage=en.
ENV/JM/MONO(2014)2, Reports on the OECD/KEMI/EU workshop on microbial pesticides assessment and management of
risks. See http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=env/jm/mono(2014)2&doclanguage=en
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4.7.3. Horizontal gene transfer
According to the Directive, the potential for gene transfer to non-related organisms under the
conditions of the proposed release and selective advantages (or disadvantages) that potential
recipients may gain, must be assessed.
4.7.3.1. Problem formulation and example of pathway to harm
The transfer of genetic information from the released organism into other organisms in the
environment may have consequences for human and animal health as well as for plants and more
general ecosystem services. The diversity of a microbiome may be reduced, and its natural balance
may be disturbed by providing a selective advantage to one or some of their members, reducing or
displacing other organisms with beneficial properties. SynBioMs may affect human, animal or plant
health by transfer of DNA encoding a harmful trait, to recipient microorganisms.
The first step in a potential pathway to harm would be that DNA of the SynBioM is transferred to
members of the natural microbiomes through mechanisms such as conjugation, transformation, or
transduction (EFSA, 2009). Microbiomes with a high diversity and cell density as well as abundant
nutrients (as they occur in the gastrointestinal tract) increase the likelihood as HGT compared to low
diversity environments, e.g. a sandy soil with low organic carbon. SynBioM DNA is from this point
forward expressed in the recipient microorganism, resulting in a trait that negatively affects
environmental microorganisms as they occur, e.g. in soils, surface waters, or gut ecosystems, including
the gastrointestinal tract of humans and farmed animals. In addition to this, SynBioMs may pose
further risks related to the ‘new-to-nature’ features of these organisms (e.g. new synthetic DNA
fragments coding for non-natural gene products or XNA).
4.7.3.2. Adequacy of guidance and methods
Potential risks as a consequence of HGT are specifically addressed in the EFSA GMM Guidance
(EFSA GMO Panel, 2011) for microorganisms, and no gaps were identified for SynBioMs with respect to
this area of risk. Therefore, potential risks as a consequence of HGT can be assessed by using the
current EFSA GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011), with the exception of xenobionts.
With respect to methodology, the EFSA GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011) does not mention
methods how to measure HGT of GMMs, nor does it give endpoints to measure. This also applies to
SynBioMs. For assessing HGT of GM plants to microorganisms by means of double homologous
recombination (DHR), EFSA has issued an Explanatory note (EFSA, 2017a). The use of bioinformatic
analysis for measuring HGT potential of GM plants is equally applicable to GMMs and SynBioMs. The
OECD has issued a guidance document in 2010 that addresses the risk assessment related to HGT
from GMMs (ENV/JM/MONO(2010)415 ). This document, developed before the wider application of
‘omic’ techniques, describes no specific tests, but gives some direction on how to assess potential risks
resulting from HGT.
Testing methods, which comprise high-throughput experimental studies, the identification of
pathways to harm (gene transfer mechanisms, including conjugation, transformation or transduction),
and the application of bioinformatic tools as well as environmental modelling, are not available. Such
methods would enable testing of the HGT potential of the SynBioM and the impact of environmental
conditions on transfer rates and possible adverse effects in the main receiving environments and
beyond.
Phase 2: For Cases 1–3 and the hypothetical xenobiont described in Case 4A, there are no
additional case-specific aspects to be mentioned for HGT. It can be predicted for Case 4A that the non-
natural building block of xeno-proteins, i.e. the non-canonical amino acids and their corresponding
tRNA, are not present in the receiving environment. Therefore, the likelihood that a natural gene
transfer recipient would gain a selective advantage by acquiring a gene coding for a xeno-peptide or
protein would be extremely low if not zero. However, for Case 4B, there is a gap with respect to
evaluating the efficacy of genetic firewalls intended to be functional with the use of XNA as a means
for gene containment, and also for the specific detection of XNA e.g. from environmental material.
The EFSA GMM Guidance for assessing HGT potential (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011) would remain valid
for such SynBioMs producing xeno-peptides, xeno-proteins and new-to-nature carbohydrates or lipids,
as long as they are encoded by DNA.
15 See https://www.oecd.org/env/ehs/biotrack/46815958.pdf
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4.7.4. Effects on target organisms
SynBioM may exert potential immediate and/or delayed environmental impacts due to the direct
and indirect effects/interactions with target organisms (if applicable).
4.7.4.1. Problem formulation and example of pathway to harm
SynBioMs may reduce ecosystem services (such as biocontrol) or biodiversity, for example through
loss of a food source for organisms that feed on the target organism.
An example for a pathway to harm with respect to this indirect effect is the following. The SynBioM
may suppress target organisms by means of a specific mechanism of action, leading to its reduction.
Consequently, this may result in loss of food source for other environmental organisms that are
dependent on this organism. Biodiversity may therefore be reduced and consequently may affect e.g.
natural biocontrol.
4.7.4.2. Adequacy of guidance and methods
Potential risks as a consequence of (in)direct effects on target organisms are not explicitly
addressed in the EFSA GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011) and no information could be found in
other guidances.
With respect to methodology, the GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011) does not mention
examples of methods to measure (in)direct effects on target organisms, nor does it give endpoints to
measure. This also applies to SynBioMs.
No validated methods exist to measure adverse effects of microorganisms resulting from (in)direct
effects on target organisms. Most methods focus on adverse effects on non-target organisms (NTOs)
(see Section 4.7.5).
New methods may be developed to predict effects resulting from the suppression or removal of
target organisms, including e.g. the implications on the ecologically important food webs to which the
target organism naturally belongs. Such methods and their modelling require sufficient knowledge on
food webs in the receiving environments, strategies to assess such implications and to determine
endpoints of measurements.
Phase 2: For Cases 1–4, there are no additional aspects to be mentioned for interactions with
target organisms.
4.7.5. Effects on non-target organisms
SynBioMs may have potential immediate and/or delayed environmental impacts due to direct and
indirect interactions with NTOs, including impacts on population levels of competitors, prey, hosts,
symbionts, predators, parasites and pathogens.
4.7.5.1. Problem formulation and example of pathway to harm
The SynBioMs can negatively affect NTOs. NTOs may include protists, insects or other organisms in
ecosystems. A SynBioM may for example deplete a nutrient source or produce a metabolite with
unintended adverse effects on organisms that are important for ecosystems functions, agricultural
productivity or the health of animals. They may also disrupt food webs by suppressing organisms that
are part of these food webs with a consequence of losing natural biocontrol of pathogens.
4.7.5.2. Adequacy of guidance and methods
Potential risks as a consequence of adverse effects on NTOs are not explicitly described in the EFSA
GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011). The NTO testing described in the EFSA GMO Panel guidance
for plants (‘Scientific Opinion on the assessment of potential impacts of genetically modified plants on
non-target organisms’) is not designed for GMMs and therefore not adequate for SynBioMs.
For PPP in general (chemicals and non-GM microorganisms used as PPP), the current assessment
takes into account a series of legal requirements16 and EFSA documents that mention which NTOs
should be tested. Methods are however not detailed. The EFSA PPR Panel Guidance for risk
16 Documents on the approval of active substances are listed on https://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/pesticides/approva
l_active_substances/eu_rules_en. Of particular interest for assessment are ‘Regulation EU 283/2013 - setting data
requirements for active substances’ and its ‘Communication - list of test methods and guidance documents’ (Part A for
chemicals, Part B for microorganisms including virus); as well as ‘Regulation EU 284/2013 – setting data requirements for
PPPs’ with its ‘Communication - list of test methods and guidance documents’(Part A for chemicals, Part B for microorganisms
including virus).
Scientific Opinion SynBioM MC and ERA
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 35 EFSA Journal 2020;18(10):6263
assessment of PPP for aquatic organisms, for example, includes a Chapter on ‘Specific protection goal
proposal for algae (e.g. green algae, diatoms, blue-greens) in edge-of-field surface water’ (EFSA PPR
Panel, 2013). For exposure through soil, the EFSA Guidance (EFSA, 2017b) includes a Chapter on the
‘Applicability of the tiered assessment scheme for microbial active substances’ that might be useful for
predicting environmental concentrations of active substances of PPP and transformation products of
these active substances in soil.
At OECD level (ENV/JM/MONO(2012)1 guidance is given on NTO testing for potential adverse
effects by non-GM microorganisms used as PPP. In ENV/JM/MONO(2012)1 OECD tests and guidelines
from US EPA, Canada and OECD are given for assessing adverse effects of microbial plant protection
agents on NTOs present in terrestrial and aquatic compartments. Guidance is also given on the types
of NTOs to be tested, depending on the type of application of the microbial plant protection agent
(e.g. spray, soil drench). This document also provides methodologies based on a tiered approach that
may be applicable for assessing SynBioMs.
Phase 2: For Cases 1 to 4 there are no additional aspects to be mentioned for interactions with
non- target organisms.
4.7.6. Effects on humans
SynBioMs may have potential immediate and/or delayed effects on human health resulting from
potential direct and indirect interactions with people working with, coming into contact with or in the
vicinity of the SynBioM release(s).
4.7.6.1. Problem formulation and example of pathway to harm
The SynBioM may be harmful to people who come into contact with the SynBioM, for example
because SynBioMs are pathogenic or toxic for humans or cause allergies in humans. This issue will be
addressed in a subsequent Work package 3 under this mandate (see Section 1.3).
4.7.7. Effect on animals
SynBioMs may have potential immediate and/or delayed effects on animal health and consequences
for the feed/food chain resulting from consumption of the SynBioM and any product derived from it, if
it is intended to be used as animal feed.
The effect of the feed on the animals will be addressed under a subsequent Work package 3 under
this mandate (see Section 1.3).
4.7.8. Effect on biogeochemical processes
SynBioMs may have potential immediate and/or delayed effects on biogeochemical processes
resulting from potential direct and indirect interactions in the receiving environments and beyond.
4.7.8.1. Problem formulation and example of pathway to harm
SynBioMs may reduce biodiversity and so alter biogeochemical processes, e.g. by negatively
affecting microorganisms or invertebrates involved in the decomposition of organic materials or the
transformation of nitrogenous compounds, sulphur or other elements. Therefore, the productivity or
ecosystems services may be negatively affected. If the SynBioMs are able to survive in the receiving
environment and produce, for example, antimicrobial compounds or metabolites that lower soil pH,
they may have adverse effects on other microorganisms or ecologically important invertebrates (e.g.
nematodes, springtails or earthworms). This may disrupt biogeochemical processes and negatively
affect plant growth.
4.7.8.2. Adequacy of guidance and methods
Potential risks as a consequence of adverse effects on biogeochemical processes are not explicitly
addressed in the EFSA GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011).
OECD document ENV/JM/MONO(2012)1 gives some guidance on testing earthworms and on
microorganisms involved in nutrient cycling. The EFSA GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011) does
not mention specific methods to measure the effects on biogeochemical processes, nor does it give
endpoints to measure. This also applies to SynBioM.
In ENV/JM/MONO(2012)1, it is mentioned that in the EU, OECD tests on nitrification and respiration
have been used to measure effects of microbial products on soil microorganisms. These tests,
Scientific Opinion SynBioM MC and ERA
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 36 EFSA Journal 2020;18(10):6263
however, are designed for chemical PPPs and are not validated for microorganisms. For the US, the US
EPA does not support testing for effects of (non-genetically modified) microbial PPPs on soil
microorganisms. ENV/JM/MONO(2012)1 describes test guidelines for earthworms as contributors to
biogeochemical processes.
There is no methodology by which generally effects on biogeochemical cycles can be tested, nor is
there a definition of measurable endpoints. New methods could be developed for this area of risk. It is
envisaged that high-throughput technologies and modelling could be the right means to evaluate the
risk associated with a potential impact on biogeochemical processes.
Phase 2: For Cases 1–4, there are no additional aspects to be mentioned for effects on
biogeochemical processes.
4.7.9. Effect on managements techniques
Possible immediate and/or delayed, direct and indirect environmental impacts of specific techniques
used for the management of the SynBioM that may differ from those used for current management
systems.
4.7.9.1. Problem formulation and example of pathway to harm
SynBioMs can have an environmental impact due to a change in the way management techniques
are used, for example because the mode of action of the SynBioM is changed, the SynBioM is applied
using a different method, or is applied in a different receiving environment.
The SynBioM, for example, developed as an improved biocontrol agent due to combining different
mechanisms of action in the organism, can lead to another regime of spraying with chemical plant
protection agents. This other regime of spraying with chemicals may have an impact on the
environment other than the original spraying regime. This impact can be positive, neutral or negative
for ecosystems or health.
4.7.9.2. Adequacy of guidance and methods
Potential effects resulting from a change in management related to the SynBioM are not explicitly
addressed in the EFSA GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011).
In the EFSA ERA Guidance for GM plants (EFSA GMO Panel, 2010), there is some guidance on how
to address environmental effects resulting from a change in management for GM plants, that may also
be applicable to SynBioMs.
The EFSA GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011) does not mention examples of methods to
measure (in)direct effects as a result of a change in management, nor does it give endpoints to
measure. This also applies to SynBioMs.
Methods to measure these effects resulting from a change in management, e.g. use of scenario
analysis, are described in the EFSA guidance on ERA of GM plants (EFSA GMO Panel, 2010).
On a case-by-case basis, new methods may need to be developed and applied in ERA.
Phase 2: For Cases 1–4, there are no additional aspects to mention for effects on management
techniques.
4.8. Concluding remarks for ERA and PMEM
For ERA, Section 4.5:
• The EFSA GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011) is a useful basis for the ERA of products
containing viable SynBioMs, because living GMMs were also foreseen in this Guidance.
However, the points raised below are suggested for future adjustments of this guidance and
equally apply to viable GMMs and SynBioMs.
• The EFSA GMM Guidance is adequate for assessing HGT potential for near-future SynBioM
cases. Future updates would benefit from expanding with descriptions of approaches to test
for adverse effects and their likelihood resulting from HGT.
• The comparative approach is still feasible for near-future SynBioM cases. For wider future
cases, the comparative approach may depend on the familiarity of the SynBioM with known
microorganisms with a history of use.
• Given a potentially altered efficacy of near future SynBioMs to interact with their environment, it
is noted that the risk assessment covering environmental compartments as potential SynBioM
habitats beyond the main receiving one may become more relevant than currently foreseen.
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Future guidance update for ERA of SynBioMs, as well as for GMMs, should take into consideration
the following aspects:
• The scope of the EFSA GMM Guidance covers the use of GMMs for food and feed. Given the
mandate of this Opinion, it is recommended that future updates of this GMM Guidance should
cover all agri-food uses, all types of microorganisms (including micro-algae, viruses), their
relevant exposure routes and receiving environments.
• Future updates of the EFSA GMM Guidance, with a scope beyond food and feed use, should
address all ‘specific areas of risk’ as per Directive 2001/18/EC.
• For extensively engineered SynBioMs, such as xenobionts, other risk assessment approaches
may be considered that are not solely based on the comparative approach for new-to-nature
components.
For PMEM, Section 4.6:
• The EFSA GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011) provides the principles for detection and
PMEM, which are applicable for near future products containing living SynBioMs.
For PMEM of SynBioMs, as well as for GMMs, guidance and knowledge are recommended to be
developed as follows.
• Future updates would benefit from including descriptions of fit-for-purpose approaches to
monitor for potential adverse effects resulting from the deliberate environmental release.
• Detailed descriptions of detection methods are recommended for current and near-future
SynBioMs as well as GMMs.
• For wider future SynBioMs, suitable detection methods can be challenging to provide, because
of the xeno-DNA structure.
5. Phase 3 and outlook
The following Sections cover an overall gap analysis that could not be captured by the previous
phases (i.e. gaps disconnected from the existing guidance documents listed in Section 2.1 or
disconnected from the selected cases). In addition, Phase 3 was also used to prepare outlooks for the
future.
5.1. Environmental interactions
Interactions between SynBioMs and natural microbial communities include for example competition
for energy sources (including light for micro-algae), nutrients or inhibition of each other through the
production of biocidal compounds or parasitism (virus). For SynBioMs, the levels of interactions as well
as the types of interactions may have been altered that could affect the exposure assessment during
ERA. These include for example synergy by cooperatively accessing new nutrient and energy sources,
cross-feeding of metabolites or exchanging genetic material by HGT and so optimising their
environmental performance. Survival and invasiveness can strongly depend on the properties of the
specific SynBioM. Requirements for growth factors may limit survival and invasiveness, while photo-
autotrophy as for micro-algae could increase both.
An altered exposure can relate to higher abundance of SynBioMs in a given environmental
compartment (e.g. rhizosphere, lake sediment, leaf surfaces) or to a wider range of such
compartments in which a SynBioM can survive. Therefore, the efficacy by which the SynBioMs interact
with the environment can differ from GMMs made by established techniques of genetic modification.
Such altered efficacy can be related to levels of exposure as described above. For example, altered
efficacy can be related to levels of exposure, such as:
• increased environmental survival and host colonisation;
• increased invasiveness;
• increased competition in naturally evolved microbial communities due to enhanced fitness, so
thereby displacing beneficial microorganisms or disrupting food webs;
• altered metabolism, e.g. by changes in substrate utilisation;
• altered lifestyle, e.g. by energy use (aerobic versus anaerobic).
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Therefore, given a potentially altered efficacy of near future SynBioMs to interact with their
environment, the presence in environmental compartments beyond the main receiving compartment
may become more relevant during ERA.
Consequently, the hazards for current and near-future SynBioMs when deliberately released into the
environment, do not differ from those for GMMs made by established techniques of genetic
modification. Although no novel hazards have been identified for near future SynBioMs, the efficacy by
which the SynBioMs interact with their biotic and abiotic environment may differ. This may lead to
increased exposure and therefore may result in higher risk.
Wider future SynBioMs, including xenobionts, aimed for deliberate release in the environment,
may lead to novel hazards compared to microorganisms developed with established genetic
modification techniques, for example because of:
• new-to-nature organisms/products/constituents possibly with poorly understood interactions
with its biotic and abiotic environment;
• xeno-proteins with new enzymatic properties, i.e. modified substrate specificity or higher
environmental robustness, and so open new niches;
• substantial reduction of the genome that could lead to unexpected interaction with other
organisms (e.g. those that lead to evasion of the immune system).
5.2. ERA Guidance for micro-algae
The considered case studies do not include micro-algae. The photoautotropic lifestyle of these
organisms is a crucial point for risk assessment and distinguishes micro-algae from most other GMMs
that have been previously considered in EFSA Guidances. Micro-algae occur predominantly in habitats
that are not usually considered in detail in ERAs so far. Hence, this constitutes a lack of RA experience,
but the same ERA framework and principles (as for viable GMMs) may apply.
In general, microalgal research is usually focused on improving and optimising native existing
production pathways (i.e. photosynthetic efficiency, lipid, pigments, among others) rather than
introducing new pathways (Wijffels, 2015). In fact, there are species capable to produce toxins
affecting human and possible animal health (Van Dolah, 2000), and a risk assessment to determine
the level of risk of such species may be necessary.
A limited number of natural micro-algae species have received the QPS status for production
purposes. When these micro-algae species would be used as a chassis for the construction of SynBio
algae, this status can be used as a basis for the risk assessment. The value of this status in risk
assessment depends on the familiarity of the SynBio micro-algae with the natural micro-algae. The MC
of the SynBio micro-algae can be established using the existing guidances, based on WGS and
phenotypic characterisation, but they should be complemented with specific guidance for the
taxonomic identification of algae and for the interpretation of WGS data. As gene annotation is far
from complete for micro-algae, the obtained information will be more limited compared with that
obtained for bacteria and fungi and, therefore, the conclusions would include higher degree of
uncertainty. This uncertainty will be increased by increasing complexity of the introduced genetic
modifications. In this regard, it is recommended that knowledge be collected to correlate gene
sequences to biological functions so that future guidance can be updated for assessing the toxigenicity
and virulence/pathogenicity of these organisms.
Some experience in the ERA of GM micro-algae has been build. The US EPA, in the USA, developed
a draft guidance ‘Draft Algae Guidance for the Preparation of TSCA Biotechnology Submissions’ for
assessing the environmental risks related to open-pond cultivation of GM micro-algae (US EPA, 2016).
Moreover, there are documents already highlighting some of the possible issues in the risk assessment
of the use of micro-algae for production purposes (Segal and Yang, 1986; Gressel, 2014; US EPA,
2016; Beacham et al., 2017).
5.3. ERA Guidance for viruses
SynBio viruses are viruses generated from a (partly) synthetically made DNA sequence, either as
such (for DNA viruses (Myhr and Traavik, 2012)) or from infectious RNA transcripts (RNA viruses, e.g.
influenza (Cox et al., 2015)). The DNA sequence designed is a (sometimes partly) synthetic copy of
the consensus sequence from the collection of genotypes present in a natural virus isolate, more
specifically viruses from plants, insects and bacteria (bacteriophages). The genotypic variation in RNA
viruses is much higher than in DNA viruses. Because of the high replication and error rate (e.g. RNA
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viruses 1/104 and DNA viruses 1/108) genotypic variation is a typical characteristic of viruses. The issue
is whether the genetic variation of SynBio viruses will be ultimately similar to that of natural virus
equivalents.
The MC of the SynBio viruses is the first step of the ERA. The genetic assembly of SynBio viruses
can be analysed by WGS and compared with the genotypic assemblies of natural viruses, if needed.
Therefore, the existing microbiological EFSA Guidances (EFSA FEEDAP Panel, 2018; EFSA CEP Panel,
2019) may be used for the risk assessment of SynBio viruses. Alphaflexiviruses, potyviruses and
baculoviruses, used as PPPs, were included in the QPS evaluations and received QPS status (EFSA
BIOHAZ Panel, 2020). Therefore, the QPS approach may be applied as a basis for risk assessment of
some SynBio viruses, using a case-by-case approach.
While the biological characteristics of SynBio viruses can be tested by conventional methodologies
(e.g. biological activity, host range, pathology), there is limited information on methodologies to assess
the impact of released SynBio viruses with respect to all the ‘specific areas of risk’ in ERA. An example
of GM virus ERA is Case 1, for which United States Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service (USDA APHIS, 2019) performed an analysis of environmental impact. However, the
approach used by these regulatory bodies did not address all the ‘specific areas of risk’ mentioned in
Directive 2001/18/EC (European Commission, 2001).
5.4. ERA Guidance for xenobionts
Due to their new-to-nature composition, xenobiotic microorganisms (xenobionts) require specific
consideration when assessing their environmental risks. Approaches developed for GMMs, e.g. the QPS
concept and the WGS-based microbial characterisation, may not be directly applicable. The
development of specific risk assessment approaches for xenobionts should consider that WGS can be
used when the genetic information is still coded in DNA, but not in SynBioM with XNA.
Xenobionts producing xeno-peptides and xeno-proteins present novel hazards, triggering a case-by-
case risk assessment that may require testing procedures that may differ from those used for non-
modified microorganisms or GMMs. For example, xeno-peptides could act as novel inhibitors of enzymes
or a new type of signal molecules. Xeno-proteins may act as enzymes with new-to-nature substrate
specificities or catalyse a novel type of chemical reaction (Agostini et al., 2017). Xeno-proteins could be
more resistant to heat or other means of inactivation, or they could represent structural macromolecules
less accessible for microbial decomposition. Xeno-peptides and xeno-proteins could also act as novel
antigens. Beyond that, xenobionts of the future may also contain or produce new-to-nature
carbohydrates or lipids that may alter cell permeability or cell structure (hypothetical case). Other
xenobionts may grow with up-to-date unused chemical elements, e.g. fluorine or boron (Schmidt et al.,
2018). This could result in a change of lifestyle and ecophysiology allowing these to enter new niches or
become more competitive in already colonised niches (e.g. in a host organism or a soil
microcompartment). Such organisms could also trigger an immunological response of host organisms
because of novel antigens. So, SynBioMs with new-to-nature carbohydrates or lipids may in fact pose
new hazards to human and animal health, as well as to the environment.
For xenobionts with novel genetic coding based on XNA, no guidance for assessing the safety of
the genetic modification for human health and the environment is yet available. While the potential to
produce new-to-nature carbohydrates, lipids and xeno-proteins involves new hazards for human health
and the environment, the replacement of DNA by XNA as a means for storing genetic information
should decrease hazards for the uncontrolled spread of modified genes into receiving environmental
and below, and the expression of XNA-encoded functions in recipients is extremely low, if not zero.
Replication of XNA in natural microbial recipients is inhibited by the absence of xeno-nucleotides as
building blocks of XNA in natural environments. Therefore, it has been suggested that XNA can act as
a firewall to prevent HGT resulting in the modification of natural microbiomes (Acevedo-Rocha and
Budisa, 2011). For the ERA, it should however be noted that the genetic firewall concept, as of today,
is only a theoretical concept, leaving out the potential that segments/fragments of XNA molecules may
gradually be transformed into DNA by host-specific DNA repair. The efficacy as a firewall in the
environmental containment of XNA should be tested and specific methodologies are recommended to
be developed. Equally, detection techniques for the presence of XNA, comparable with the use of
polymerase chain reaction or gene probes for DNA, would be an essential tool for monitoring of
xenobionts with XNA.
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5.5. Outlook for new approaches to ERA of SynBioM
The specific features of SynBioMs and the limitations identified in the existing guidances support
the need for new approaches for ERA of these microorganisms. These new risk assessment strategies
should take in consideration the continuous and rapid advancement in methodologies to study the
biological systems. This Section applies equally to GMMs.
5.5.1. Systems approaches
Systems approaches address ERA from a holistic point of view, by taking into account the many
interactions following a specific intervention, being it SynBioMs released into the environment or
microbiomes in soils, water, plants or animals. Systems approaches make extensive use of a variety of
modelling and data analysis technologies to allow for assessment of factors such as exposure,
persistence, invasiveness, (horizontal) gene transfer, genetic stability, pathogenicity, environmental
fate, etc. Such approaches include: genome-scale constraint-based models of microbiome (van der Ark
et al., 2017); network analysis of microbiomes/microbiota within their environments; models of
microbial interactions and functioning and fate of genetic material; and data modelling using
probabilistic models and evolutionary models. However, these approaches are not yet tested and
validated for the ERA of microorganisms.
5.5.2. New testing methods for microbial interactions
SynBioMs released into the environment will inevitably come into contact with the resident microbial
communities. Therefore, when there is deliberate introduction into an open environment it is expected
that SynBioMs affect the existing microbiomes, e.g. for feed additives the microbial communities
colonising the gastrointestinal tract or for biological fertilisers, soils and rhizospheres. Accordingly, the
existing ERA guidance for GMMs requires an assessment of interactions of SynBioMs with microbiomes,
e.g. when evaluating environmental survival, persistence over time and invasiveness, HGT, interactions
with target and NTOs, or impact on biogeochemical processes.
To assess these effects, information can be achieved by high-throughput DNA sequencing, either by
metagenomics, studying the total DNA, or by PCR amplicon sequencing that analyses the diversity of
specific genetic markers. The suitability of applying either one of these methods or both may depend
on the hazards and risks identified for a particular organism, i.e. on a case-by-case basis. This may
also trigger additional analyses that evaluate the activity or gene expression products, by means of
metatranscriptomics and metaproteomics, respectively. Even with the complete genetic information of
a synthetic microorganism, it is beyond the capacity of any existent bioinformatic analysis to fully
predict the capability of a synthetic organism to survive, colonise and interact with other organisms
under natural conditions, given the uncountable diversity of potential microhabitats and their temporal
variability. Therefore, the knowledge obtained by WGS of the SynBioM introduced in the natural
environments should be complemented with studies targeted to appraise the interactions of SynBioM
with environmental microbiomes on a case-by-case basis.
While the spatial and temporal complexity of environmental conditions cannot all be mimicked
under laboratory, or otherwise standardised conditions, the lack of prediction about potential
interactions could require test systems in which the survival and interactions between synthetic
organisms and natural microbial communities can be assessed. The goal of such systems is ultimately
to predict environmental risks, i.e. adverse effects on ecosystem services provided by environmental
microbial communities. As an example, there are now technical options for high-throughput testing at
a small, miniaturised scale, to mimic a wide range of environmental conditions. Miniaturised platforms
could deliver standards of reference for a wide range of situations, including long-term persistence,
biological status of the cells at endpoints, worst case scenarios. However, these approaches have not
yet been tested and validated for the ERA of microorganisms.
6. Overall conclusions
6.1. Identification of newer sectors/advances
ToR1: EFSA was asked to consider whether and which newer sectors/advances should be
considered among SynBio developments, in addition to the six identified by the SCs. In response, a
horizon scan based on a literature search and under the conditions at the start of this Opinion was
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performed for products over the next decade. The WG experts furthermore added to that scan during
the full duration of this Opinion with further knowledge. The conclusions reached are as follows:
• No other sectors/advances were identified in addition to the six identified by the SCs.
17
• There are no clear criteria to differentiate between a GMM and a SynBioM.
• From a technical point of view, there are SynBioM applications (e.g. Cases 1, 2 and 3) that
could be ready for deliberate release into the environment of the EU in the next decade.
However, extensively engineered SynBioMs (e.g. minimal cells and protocells, xenobionts),
falling within the remit of EFSA, are not expected for deliberate release into the environment
of the EU in the next decade.
• Information on new SynBioM products for deliberate release may not be made publicly
available at early stages of their development. This situation limits the predictive capacity of
this Opinion.
6.2. New hazards/risks
ToR2: EFSA was requested to identify, if possible, potential risks in terms of impact on humans,
animals and the environment that current and near-future SynBio developments could pose; EFSA was
also asked to identify potential novel hazards compared with established techniques of genetic
modification.18 This Opinion is focused on the ERA, whereas the risk assessment for humans and
farmed animals will be addressed in Work package 3 under the current mandate.
It was concluded that the hazards for current and near-future SynBioMs when deliberately
released into the environment, do not differ from those for GMMs made by established techniques of
genetic modification. Although no novel hazards have been identified for near future SynBioMs, the
efficacy by which the SynBioMs interact with their biotic and abiotic environment may differ. This may
lead to increased exposure and therefore may result in higher risk.
Wider future SynBioMs, aimed for deliberate release in the environment, may lead to novel
hazards compared to microorganisms developed with established genetic modification techniques, e.g.
due to new-to-nature components or (substantially) reduced genomes with poorly understood
interactions with its biotic and abiotic environment.
The assessment to identify novel hazards or risks should always be performed on a case-by-case basis.
6.3. Adequacy of existing guidelines
ToR3: EFSA is requested to determine if the existing guidelines for risk assessment are adequate
and sufficient for current and near-future SynBio developments or if there is a need for updated
guidance.
Concluding remarks for microbial characterisation (genotypic and phenotypic):
• For the genotypic and phenotypic characterisation of SynBioMs and the safety of the genetic
modification, the FEEDAP Guidance on microbial characterisation (EFSA FEEDAP Panel, 2018),
the CEP statement (EFSA CEP Panel, 2019) and the GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011)
on characterisation of the recipient strain are useful as a basis for the assessment.
• Adequacy of existing EFSA Guidances for SynBioMs depends on the degree of familiarity of the
SynBioM and chassis with the non-modified microorganism. The extent to which the existing
body of knowledge on the microorganism can be used in the risk assessment will be higher
when there is a high degree of familiarity with the SynBioM and chassis. The following
guidance is adequate and sufficient in this context:
– WGS analysis is essential for SynBioMs, irrespective of them being bacteria, archaea,
viruses, viroids or eukaryotic microorganisms such as protists, fungi and algae.
– Explaining the purpose of the development of the SynBioM using a certain chassis is
essential.
– WGS, which can be used for taxonomic identification, identification of antimicrobial
resistance genes, searching sequences related to antimicrobial production, toxigenic and
17 Six SynBio developments: 1) genetic part libraries and methods; 2) minimal cells and designer chassis; 3) protocells and
artificial cells; 4) xenobiology; 5) DNA synthesis and genome editing; and 6) citizen science (do-it-yourself biology).
18 For the purpose of this mandate, the terms ‘established techniques of genetic modification’ refers to various genetic
engineering techniques that have been significantly used over the last 30 years to produce genetically modified organisms,
such as those which have been authorised under Directive 2001/18/EC and Regulation (EU) No 1829/2003.
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virulence/pathogenic characteristics, mobile genetic elements and characterisation of the
genetic modifications of the SynBioM.
– QPS concept for the risk assessment of building block of SynBioMs (e.g. chassis, metabolic
building blocks);
– phenotypic testing for the production of antimicrobial compounds;
– weight of evidence approach for the assessment of toxigenicity and pathogenicity based
on bioinformatics analysis, body of knowledge and the use of model systems;
– need for collecting information on the source and natural habitat of the recipient
microorganism;
– possibility of transfer of genetic material to other microorganisms;
– genetic stability;
– pathogenicity, ecological and physiological traits;
– history of use;
– rate and level of expression of gene products resulting from the genetic modification;
– need for a unique identifier.
Concluding remarks for ERA:
• The EFSA GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011) is a useful basis for the ERA of products
containing viable SynBioMs, because living GMMs were also foreseen in this Guidance.
However, the points raised below are suggested for future adjustments of this guidance and
equally apply to viable GMMs and SynBioMs.
• The EFSA GMM Guidance is adequate for assessing HGT potential for near-future SynBioM
cases. Future updates would benefit from expanding with descriptions of approaches to test
for adverse effects and their likelihood resulting from HGT.
• The comparative approach is still feasible for near-future SynBioM cases. For wider future
cases, the comparative approach may depend on the familiarity of the SynBioM with known
microorganisms with a history of use.
• Given a potentially altered efficacy of near future SynBioMs to interact with their environment,
it is noted that the risk assessment covering environmental compartments as potential
SynBioM habitats beyond the main receiving one may become more relevant than currently
foreseen.
Concluding remarks on PMEM:
• The EFSA GMM Guidance (EFSA GMO Panel, 2011) provides the principles for detection and
PMEM, which are applicable for near future products containing living SynBioMs.
6.4. Need for new guidance
ToR4: In the latter case, EFSA was requested to identify the specific areas for which such updated
guidance is needed.
For microbial and molecular characterisation of SynBioMs, as well as for GMMs, guidance and
knowledge is recommended to be developed:
1) for micro-algae: specialised guidance for the genomic and phenotypic characterisation.
2) for yeast and fungi: phenotypic testing for antimycotic resistance;
3) for xenobionts: guidance not based on history of use and not solely based on the
comparative approach for the new-to-nature components;
4) for XNA: guidance for characterisation and detection;
5) for xenobionts, extensively engineered SynBioMs, micro-algae and viruses: suitable model
systems for testing virulence and pathogenicity for non-target hosts.
For environmental risk assessment of SynBioMs, as well as for GMMs, guidance and knowledge are
recommended to be developed:
1) The scope of the EFSA GMM Guidance covers the use of GMMs for food and feed. Given the
mandate of this Opinion, the future update of the GMM Guidance should cover all agri-food
uses, all types of microorganisms (incl. micro-algae, viruses), their relevant exposure routes
and receiving environments.
2) Future updates of the EFSA GMM Guidance, with a scope beyond food and feed use, should
address all ‘specific areas of risk’ as per Directive 2001/18/EC.
Scientific Opinion SynBioM MC and ERA
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 43 EFSA Journal 2020;18(10):6263
3) For extensively engineered SynBioMs, such as xenobionts, other risk assessment approaches
may be considered that are not solely based on the comparative approach for new-to-
nature components.
For PMEM of SynBioMs, as well as for GMMs, guidance and knowledge are recommended to be
developed:
1) Future updates would benefit from including descriptions of fit-for-purpose approaches to
monitor for potential adverse effects resulting from the deliberate environmental release.
2) Detailed descriptions of detection methods are recommended for current and near-future
SynBioMs as well as GMMs.
3) For wider future SynBioMs, suitable detection methods can be challenging to provide,
because of the xeno-DNA structure.
7. Recommendations
The following is recommended:
• Research for innovative approaches in the frame of ERA of SynBioMs as well as viable GMMs,
focusing on methods to assess HGT, invasiveness and other areas of risk for SynBioMs
deliberately released into the environment. In this respect, advantage could be taken of recent
technological advancement in methodologies for investigating complex microbial communities
and microbiomes.
• Additional research on (functional) gene/genome annotation for all microorganisms, in
particular for understudied groups like micro-algae.
• Increasing knowledge on microbial interactions, microbiome function and interactions with the
receiving environments for the wider understanding of community function and risk
assessment/management of the effect of SynBioMs as well as GMMs.
• Development and deployment of systems approaches. These should rely on large-scale
mathematical and statistical models as well as on semantic technologies and big data analytics
to support (environmental) risk assessment.
• The concept of developing a limited number of engineerable, safe-by-design and reusable
SynBioM chassis to create the opportunity to base the risk assessment on the performance of
the chassis under prespecified environmental conditions. This may offer the opportunity to
evaluate a presumption of safety concept for a specific chassis.
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Glossary
Barcoding DNA barcoding is a method of identifying organisms based on a short,
standardised fragment of genomic DNA. It has been developed for use by
taxonomists, ecologists, conservation biologists, regulatory agencies, and
others
Cell-free systems subsets of biochemical reactions that happen within cells, made in vitro apart
from a full cell system
Chassis A naturally derived or highly engineered organism repurposed to build,
maintain and amplify the components necessary for deployment of synthetic
biological systems and their applications. For the purpose of this opinion the
meaning of the term deals with live cells containing an editable genome. It is
noted that cell-free systems, reconstructed vesicles and nucleoid-dissolved
cells (i.e. with no DNA) have also been occasionally described as chassis
Comparative
approach
Analysis of potential adverse effects resulting from a GMM when compared
with a counterpart with familiarity
Deliberate release Any intentional introduction into the environment of a GMM or a combination
of GMMs for which no specific containment measures are used to limit their




A workflow for synthetic biology applications that entails an iterative cycle of
designing the system, building it, testing it and learning from the results of
testing, often with the help of machine learning and artificial intelligence. This
workflow mirrors those for engineering and computer sciences
Environmental risk
assessment
is defined as the evaluation of risks to human health and the environment,
whether direct or indirect, immediate or delayed, which the deliberate release
or the placing on the market of GMMs may pose and carried out in accordance
with Annex II of Directive (2001/18/EC)
Extensively
engineered
Organisms where either a large proportion of the chromosome has been
genetically modified or central metabolic pathways (e.g. for energy conversion
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or anabolism) of an organism have been modified. Also Xenobionts are
considered to be extensively engineered
Familiarity The concept of “familiarity” refers to the fact that most GMMs to be used for
food or feed purposes belong to well-characterised microbial species. This
“familiarity” allows the risk assessor to draw on previous knowledge and
experience with the introduction of similar microorganisms into food and the
environment. “Familiarity” will also derive from the knowledge and experience
available from the risk/safety analysis conducted prior to the scale-up of the
microorganism in a particular environment (OECD, 1993a,b and EFSA GMO
Panel, 2006)
Genetic circuit An assembly of biological parts including regions encoding RNA or protein that
enables individual cells to respond and interact with each other to perform
some logical functions (such as signal processing and decision making)
Genetic Firewall Result of an engineering approach to biologically control the unintended
environmental spread of the SynBioM or its genetic material via gene transfer
to other organisms
Genome Editing Technology in which DNA is inserted, deleted, modified or replaced in the
genome of a viable organism. Genome editing targets the modifications to
site-specific locations. As explained in the Scientific Advice Mechanism (SAM)
Explanatory note of April 2017 (SAM, 2017), genome editing aims to achieve a
precise alteration of a DNA sequence in a cell, or to achieve random changes
at precise locations
Hazard A biological, chemical or physical agent in, or condition of, food or feed with the
potential to cause an adverse health effect (From Regulation (EC) No 178/2002,
(European Commission, 2002)). According to the EC Council Decision of 200219,
hazard is the potential of an organism to cause harm to or adverse effects on
human health and/or the environment.
Metabolic engineering Metabolic engineering is generally defined as the redirection of one or more
enzymatic reactions to produce new compounds in an organism, improve the
production of existing compounds, or mediate the degradation of compounds.
Metabolic engineering can also be used to expand the eco-physiology of
SynBioM
Micro-algae A polyphyletic group of unicellular photosynthetic eukaryotes, typically found
in freshwater and marine systems
Microbiome Microbiome refers collectively to communities of microorganisms and their
combined genomes in a defined environment
Microorganism A definition of microorganism is provided in Article 2 of Directive 2009/41/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 May 2009 on the
contained use of genetically modified microorganisms (European Commission,
2009): ‘microorganism’ means any microbiological entity, cellular or non-
cellular, capable of replication or of transferring genetic material, including
viruses, viroids, and animal and plant cells in culture
Minimal cells A cell whose genome only encodes the minimal set of genes necessary for the




A risk management tool that provides a mechanism to monitor possible
adverse environmental consequences of the GM product e.g those that are
included in the risk assessment, in accordance to Annex VII of the Directive
2001/18/EC
Problem formulation The process including the identification of characteristics of the GMM capable
of causing potential adverse effects to the environment (hazards) of the
nature of these effects, and of pathways of exposure through which the GMM
may adversely affect the environment (hazard identification). It also includes
defining the assessment endpoints and setting of specific hypotheses to guide
19 European Commission, 2002. Council Decision of 3 October 2002 establishing guidance notes supplementing Annex VII to
Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the deliberate release into the environment of
genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC. Official Journal of the European Communities L,
pp. 27–36.
Scientific Opinion SynBioM MC and ERA
www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 48 EFSA Journal 2020;18(10):6263
the generation and evaluation of data in the next risk assessment steps
(hazard and exposure characterisation)
Protocells An approach to engineering novel biological systems working strictly from the
‘bottom up’ and attempting to construct new simple forms of living systems,
using chemical and physical processes and employing as raw ingredients only
materials that were never alive. Currently, the systems constructed by bottom-





This is a harmonised generic pre-assessment approach applied by EFSA for
the safety of biological agents used in food and/or feed. This approach is
based on extensive reiterative scientific literature review and absence of
reported hazards or risks
Receiving
environment
The immediate environment into which microorganisms (including SynBioM)
will be released
Risk A function of the probability of an adverse health or environmental effect and
the severity of that effect, consequential to a hazard (From Regulation (EC)
No 178/2002 (European Commission, 2002)). According to the EC Council
Decision of 2002,20 risk is defined as the combination of the magnitude of the
consequences of a hazard, if it occurs, and the likelihood that the
consequences occur.
Safe-by-design A principle aiming to develop safe new products (e.g. SynBioMs) by taking into
account all aspects of the product as well as of the process, from the initial
ideas of the project, up to the well-characterised final product
Synthetic Biology An interdisciplinary field at the interface of engineering and biology aiming to
develop new biological systems and impart new functions to viable cells with
potential applications (for the purpose of this Opinion) in the food and feed
and environment system
Systems approaches The systems approach principle places individual system elements in their
environments and observes the relationships between them. This approach
relies on large-scale mathematical and statistical models as well as on
semantic technologies, big data analytics and artificial intelligence
Xenobiology A branch of SynBio that started to design alternative biochemical components
for bioengineering other than DNA or the 20 canonical amino acids
Abbreviations
AMR antimicrobial resistance
ANI average nucleotide identity
CEF Panel on Food Contact Materials, Enzymes and Processing Aids
CIA critically important antimicrobials
CTV Citrus tristeza virus
DHR double homologous recombination
ERA environmental risk assessment
FEEDAP Panel on Additives and Products or Substances used in Animal Feed
GM genetically modified
GMM genetically modified microorganisms
GMO genetically modified organisms
HGT horizontal gene transfer
HIA highly important antimicrobials
iGEM International Genetically Engineered Machine
MC microbial characterisation
MIC minimum inhibitory concentration
MLST multilocus sequence typing
NTOs non-target organisms
20 European Commission, 2002. Council Decision of 3 October 2002 establishing guidance notes supplementing Annex VII to
Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the deliberate release into the environment of
genetically modified organisms and repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC. Official Journal of the European Communities L,
pp. 27–36.
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OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PMEM post-market environmental monitoring
PPP plant protection products
QPS qualified presumption of safety
RA risk assessment
SAM Scientific Advice Mechanism
SC Scientific Committee
SCCS Scientific Committee on Consumer Safety
SCENIHR Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks
SCHER Scientific Committee on Health and Environmental Risks
SynBio synthetic biology
SynBioM microorganism obtained through synthetic biology
ToR Term of Reference
WG Working Group
WGS whole genome sequencing
WHO World Health Organization
XNA xeno-nucleic acid
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